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Article 
The Synergy of Toxic Tort Law and Public Health: 
Lessons From a Century of Cigarettes  
JEAN MACCHIAROLI EGGEN 
Toxic torts is a relatively new area of the law, but its seeds were sown 
a century ago with developments in modern culture.  The design, 
manufacture, and marketing of the cigarette constituted one such 
development, one with far-reaching legal consequences which continue to 
challenge the legal system today.  This Article is built around Allan M. 
Brandt’s 2007 public health history of cigarettes, The Cigarette Century.  
It uses Brandt’s book as a stepping stone to a broader discussion of 
current critical issues in toxic tort law.  The Article begins with a review of 
the book, then moves into a discussion of the ways in which the watershed 
events in law and science that surrounded the cigarette in the twentieth 
century have shaped the major legal issues in toxic tort law today.  In 
conducting this anlysis, I focus on the three major areas of toxic tort law: 
scientific causation, preemption, and mass toxic tort litigation.  I 
demonstrate that the public health history of cigarettes offers many lessons 
for judges, attorneys, and legal scholars in addressing the most troubling 
issues that arise in toxic tort litigation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ARTICLE CONTENTS 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 563 
II.  THE CIGARETTE CENTURY: SCIENCE AND POPULAR  
CULTURE IN THE SERVICE OF A PRODUCT ............................... 566 
A.  SOCIAL FACTORS................................................................................. 567 
B.  THE RISE OF THE “NEW EPIDEMIOLOGY” ............................................ 570 
C.  THE ROUGH ROAD TO REGULATION.................................................... 575 
D.  THE ERA OF TOBACCO LITIGATION ..................................................... 580 
E.  GLOBALIZATION .................................................................................. 584 
III.  PERSPECTIVES ON CHRONIC ILLNESS AND TOXIC TORTS.... 586 
A.  SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION AND CHRONIC ILLNESS AT  
MID-CENTURY................................................................................ 586 
B.  THE SCIENCE OF TOXIC TORT LITIGATION IN HISTORICAL  
CONTEXT ........................................................................................ 589 
IV.  PREEMPTION AND THE INTERACTION OF PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE LAW.................................................................................... 594 
V.  MASS TORT LITIGATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH GOALS .......... 600 
VI.  CONCLUSION..................................................................................... 607 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
The Synergy of Toxic Tort Law and Public Health: 
Lessons From a Century of Cigarettes  
JEAN MACCHIAROLI EGGEN∗ 
AA lawyer without history . . . is a mechanic.@ 
-Sir Walter Scott, 1815 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The study and practice of law are becoming increasingly 
interdisciplinary.  Toxic tort law embodies this trend with its merger of law 
and science.  Toxic tort litigation typically requires attorneys and judges to 
display a sophisticated understanding of science, rendering legal doctrine 
only part of a complicated picture that focuses on the interplay of federal 
and state regulations with the common law.  Indeed, toxic tort law 
represents the quintessential merger of public regulation and private law.1  
Rarely does a tort action involving toxic exposures begin and end with the 
common law.  Rather, most toxic litigation typically invokes an array of 
regulatory measures based upon scientific studies that have emerged over 
time with varying degrees of reliability.  The result has been that both toxic 
tort law and the regulation of toxic substances have evolved in 
unpredictable and synergistic ways.2 
Nowhere is the tension between public and private law more evident 
than in the area of consumer products, due to the availability, 
desirability,and potential hazard of many products to the consuming 
                                                                                                                          
∗ Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law; member, Widener Health Law Institute.  
The author wishes to thank Laura Ray and John Culhane for their helpful suggestions on an earlier draft 
of this article, and Janet Lindenmuth for technical support. 
1 See Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Toxic Torts at Ground Zero, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 383, 385 (2007) 
(“Toxic torts, in contrast to traditional torts, consistently present mixed issues of private and public 
law.”); Allan Kanner, Toxic Tort Litigation in a Regulatory World, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 535, 536 (2002) 
(discussing “the importance of a continuing role for toxic tort litigation in a world increasingly 
dominated by the public law”). 
2 One classic example of this synergy relates to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2000), known as the 
“Superfund” statute, enacted by Congress in 1980.  Congress considered, but expressly declined to 
include, provisions for compensation of persons who claimed injuries from releases of hazardous 
substances into the environment.  Instead, such claimants were left to seek whatever remedies may be 
available under the common law.  Id. § 9659(h) (2000).  CERCLA contains a citizens’ suit provision, 
id. § 9659, which provides only for injunctive relief and civil penalties.  See id. § 9659(c) (2000) (“The 
district court shall have jurisdiction . . . to order such action as may be necessary to correct the 
violation, and to impose any civil penalty provided for the violation.”).  
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public.  In The Cigarette Century,3 Allan M. Brandt, the Amalie Moses 
Kass Professor of the History of Medicine at Harvard Medical School and 
professor in the Department of the History of Science at Harvard 
University,4 has written a comprehensive public health history of the 
paradigmatic American consumer product of the twentieth century.  While 
other histories of tobacco5 and the tobacco industry6 have been published 
over the years, The Cigarette Century, a massive and well-documented 
600-page tome, is unique in its intense focus on the broad public health 
impact and legal implications of the cigarette, a relatively late entry into 
the tobacco industry’s arsenal of products, and in its author’s status as a 
scholar of the history of public health.  Brandt has analyzed a century of 
cigarette production, marketing, and litigation in the United States and, 
more recently, globally, and has concluded that the tobacco industry has 
perpetrated the “crime of the century” on the public.7 
Although The Cigarette Century focuses exclusively on the tobacco 
industry, its value extends far beyond the legal and public health 
implications of a single product.  Indeed, perhaps its greatest value is in 
illuminating the public health issues, and related legal issues, presented by 
toxic substances generally.  The history of the cigarette embodies the 
developing tensions between the regulatory and judicial regimes, and the 
legal struggles sparked by the cigarette have served as a prototype for 
ongoing legal battles in other areas of toxic tort law.   
Traditionally, tort law and public regulation have served separate 
purposes.  Tort law is a remedial regime that exists to compensate persons 
who have suffered legally cognizable injuries.8  While compensation is its 
most frequently articulated goal, the tort system serves a complex 
collection of other policy goals.  Chief among these goals is deterrence of 
future harmful conduct through restraints, financial or otherwise, imposed 
upon liable defendants by the judicial system.  In contrast, regulation of 
potentially toxic substances principally has sought to prevent injuries from 
occurring in the first instance.  Statutes such as the Toxic Substances 
Control Act,9 the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act,10 and the Occupational 
                                                                                                                          
3 See generally ALLAN M. BRANDT, THE CIGARETTE CENTURY: THE RISE, FALL, AND DEADLY 
PERSISTENCE OF THE PRODUCT THAT DEFINED AMERICA (2007).  
4 The Cigarette Century: About the Author, http://www.cigarettecentury.com/author.html (last 
visited Sept. 12, 2008). 
5 See, e.g., IAIN GATELY, TOBACCO: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF HOW AN EXOTIC PLANT SEDUCED 
CIVILIZATION (2001); see also SMOKE: A GLOBAL HISTORY OF SMOKING (Sander L. Gilman & Zhou 
Xun eds., 2004) (examining the cultural history of smoking worldwide). 
6 See generally RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES: AMERICA’S HUNDRED-YEAR CIGARETTE 
WAR, THE PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE UNABASHED TRIUMPH OF PHILIP MORRIS (1996). 
7 BRANDT, supra note 3, at 493. 
8 Kanner, supra note 1, at 542. 
9 Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2692 (2000).  TSCA includes a 
statement that “adequate authority should exist to regulate chemical substances and mixtures which 
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Safety and Health Act11 exemplify federal regulatory efforts to prevent 
health or environmental hazards from causing harm.  The regulatory 
approach is founded upon the aspirational notion of democratic decisions 
achieved through a governmental process that makes use of agency 
expertise of unimpeachable neutrality.12  Yet, substantial tension exists 
between the role of the government and the role of the courts in matters 
related to toxic exposures.  The Cigarette Century documents that tension 
in the context of the battle between the public health community and the 
tobacco industry.13  Cigarettes in many ways serve as a microcosm of the 
world of toxic torts, and Brandt has meticulously examined that 
microcosm.   
This Article considers the legal lessons that the cigarette offers toxic 
tort litigation generally.  Part II presents a general review of The Cigarette 
Century as a whole.  Following Part II, the remainder of this Article 
focuses on the sections of the book most germane to toxic tort litigation 
today and the lessons that can be gleaned from examining one toxic tort in 
historical detail.  Part III discusses Brandt’s observations on the revolution 
in epidemiological science and public health policy in the middle of the 
twentieth century as they relate to our understanding of toxic tort law.  This 
Article demonstrates that the legacy of that pivotal period in public health 
research continues to impact, for better or worse, current toxic tort 
litigation.  Part IV examines another watershed event in cigarette history—
labeling regulation and the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc.14  Cipollone has become a mainstay of the 
Supreme Court’s product preemption jurisprudence, and this Article shows 
how that decision impacts toxic tort cases today.   Part V addresses mass 
litigation and the role played by tobacco litigation and the 1998 Master 
Settlement Agreement in shaping current judicial views toward aggregative 
litigation.  This Article concludes that understanding the ways in which the 
                                                                                                                          
present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment, and to take action with respect to 
chemical substances and mixtures which are imminent hazards . . . .”  Id. § 2601(b)(2). 
10 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2000).  One example of the 
many safety concerns addressed by the Act is the misbranding of food, drugs, and medical devices.  See 
id. § 331(b) (prohibiting “[t]he adulteration or misbranding of any food, drug, device, or cosmetic in 
interstate commerce”). 
11 Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2000).  Among the purposes and 
goals of the Act was “encouraging employers and employees in their efforts to reduce the number of 
occupational safety and health hazards at their places of employment, and to stimulate employers and 
employees to institute new and to perfect existing programs for providing safe and healthful working 
conditions . . . .”  Id. § 651(b)(1). 
12 See Kanner, supra note 1, at 543 (noting that the “[the agency’s] job in the environmental area 
is to eliminate conflicts or strike balance, where possible, between economic growth and the 
environment”).  Kanner argues that the tort system strikes a better balance in this area.  See id. at 545 
(contrasting the tort system to political and bureaucratic alternatives that are often influenced by narrow 
interest groups). 
13 See, e.g., BRANDT, supra note 3, at 211. 
14 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992). 
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events surrounding a century of cigarettes have shaped current toxic tort 
law is crucial to shaping the future. 
II.  THE CIGARETTE CENTURY: SCIENCE AND POPULAR CULTURE IN THE 
SERVICE OF A PRODUCT 
Early in The Cigarette Century, Brandt reports that “[m]ore than one in 
five American adults still smoke regularly, and today tobacco still kills 
more than 435,000 U.S. citizens each year (more than HIV, alcohol, illicit 
drugs, suicide, and homicide combined).”15  The majority of the book is an 
effort to analyze and understand the contingencies that gave rise to those 
shameful statistics and that made tobacco one of the most significant 
consumer products of the twentieth century.16  Brandt summarizes his 
public-health approach to the subject as one that seeks “to layer temporally 
those forces that serve to explain the changing dynamics of tobacco use 
and the development of a massive pandemic in the twentieth century.”17  
Brandt achieves this goal admirably, considering that the subject he tackles 
is as sprawling as the corporate tentacles of the tobacco industry he 
chronicles. 
In contrast, Richard Kluger, in his excellent and comprehensive history 
of the tobacco industry published in 1996, Ashes to Ashes, was concerned 
more with the business and corporate history of tobacco.18  Kluger’s view 
of the business is focused and microscopic, and his book is an 
encyclopedic survey of the industry.  Ashes to Ashes was published, 
however, prior to many of the important events that have occurred in the 
past decade.  The Cigarette Century has the advantage of including those 
events.  But more significantly, Brandt, as both an insider in the public 
health community and a historian, has added a new and valuable dimension 
to the ignominious story of the tobacco industry.  His approach to the book 
as a whole combines fascinating historical observations of the watershed 
moments of public health history triggered by tobacco events with a strong 
measure of public health advocacy.  Brandt’s The Cigarette Century is a 
prism through which attorneys, judges, and legal scholars can look and 
learn so as to shape the future of toxic tort law.  It is therefore instructive to 
                                                                                                                          
15 BRANDT, supra note 3, at 13. 
16 The cigarette is the most significant consumer product in toxic tort law.  While I would argue 
that asbestos is the single most significant product in toxic tort law generally, the claimants in the vast 
majority of asbestos cases have been persons who were exposed in the workplace.  In contrast, tobacco 
products are consumer products in the sense that the products were mass marketed to the general 
public.  The result was that anyone could be exposed, either those actually consuming the product, or 
those persons in the proximity of the consumers. 
17 BRANDT, supra note 3, at 13. 
18 KLUGER, supra note 6, at xix.  In the Foreword, Kluger states: “The question, then, is whether 
cigarette merchants are businessmen basically like any other, selling a product judged to be highly 
hazardous long after its usefulness to millions was well established . . . or are they moral lepers preying 
on the ignorant, the miserable, the emotionally vulnerable, and the genetically susceptible?”  Id. 
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begin with a general review of the book and its contents before embarking 
upon a discussion of its special relevance to the law of toxic torts. 
A.  Social Factors 
Brandt sets up his discussion of the public health history of cigarettes 
by placing the events in their social context.  He interwines his narrative of 
the social context and symbology of cigarettes in the twentieth century 
with the broadening quest of the public health community to uncover and 
comprehend the threat cigarettes pose.  Thus, Brandt begins by identifying 
the social factors that gave rise to the public health crisis of smoking.  The 
first of these factors was the establishment, and subsequent dissolution, of 
the American Tobacco Company,19 known as the “Tobacco Trust.”20  
Brandt observes that following the United States Supreme Court’s 1911 
decision holding that the Tobacco Trust violated the federal Sherman 
Antitrust Act and ordering the dissolution of the American Tobacco 
Company,21 the industry merely circled its wagons and established a 
unified and secretive monolithic front.22  This move enabled the industry to 
promote and market its product for a century with virtually no 
governmental intrusion. 
The second social factor was the transformation within American 
society from moral opposition to smoking to unprecedented enthusiastic 
acceptance of a product with known hazards.23  When American society 
began to shed the Victorian attitudes that were embodied in the temperance 
movement, youth and women became avid consumers of cigarettes.24  For 
America’s youth, the cigarette represented adulthood and rebellion; for 
women, freedom from the strictures of a society that had prevented them 
                                                                                                                          
19 At its inception, the American Tobacco Company accounted for ninety percent of all sales of 
cigarettes in the United States.  BRANDT, supra note 3, at 34. 
20 The Tobacco Trust operated as a monopoly, restricting competition, consolidating the industry, 
and developing a marketing network.  Id. at 34–37. 
21 United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 181–82, 187–88 (1911). 
22 Brandt notes that in the immediate aftermath of this ruling, the industry continued to operate in 
essentially the same fashion.  BRANDT, supra note 3, at 41–42 (“Dissolving the monopoly merely put 
an oligopoly in its place.”). 
23 This transformation occurred as a result of several agents acting in concert.  In the early years 
of the twentieth century, American society was in the clutches of a temperance movement that equated 
tobacco with alcohol.  Id. at 45–46.  As a result, antismoking organizations pressed for protections for 
minors, restrictions on smoking in public places, and bans on women smoking.  One publication 
reported an alleged study that demonstrated an association between juvenile smoking and juvenile 
delinquency.  Id. at 47 (quoting HENRY FORD, THE CASE AGAINST THE LITTLE WHITE SLAVER: 
VOLUME I, II, III & IV 29 (1916)).  An early movement proclaiming the rights of nonsmokers sought 
restrictions on smoking in restaurants and other public places.  Id. at 49.  In 1908, an ordinance was 
passed that prohibited women from smoking in public.  Id. at 57.  Brandt states: “Cigarette smoking 
among young women was often viewed by critics as the first step down a slippery path of moral decline 
that led to drinking, petting, and ‘other’ sexual behavior.”  Id. at 58. 
24 Id. at 57. 
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from experiencing full equality.25  Its appeal was that it represented 
“virtually all things to all people.”26 
The third social factor Brandt examines was the industry’s 
development of a sophisticated marketing and public relations machine.  
The industry did not hesitate to take full advantage of the shifting cultural 
landscape to build its product into the preeminent leisure consumer 
product.27  It did so, according to Brandt, through a campaign of 
advertising and promotion designed to lead the consuming public to 
believe that it had chosen to smoke without undue commercial influence.  
Brandt’s position is that the tobacco industry manipulated public attitudes 
and knowledge in such a way as to deprive the consuming public of 
important facts regarding the health hazards of its products and to associate 
cigarette smoking with desirable cultural images, such as modernity, 
acceptance, and attractiveness.28 
The conjunction of these three social factors allowed the industry to 
embrace and promote the concept of free choice, or “consent,” to 
manipulate the consuming public; this concept would have important 
implications for both regulation and tort litigation.  The public was lured 
into believing that it had voluntarily chosen to smoke and had not been 
induced by advertising or, as later scientific studies demonstrated, become 
addicted.  This “engineering of consent”29 was to remain a key component 
of the industry’s strategy for the promotion of cigarettes through most of 
the twentieth century. 
The notion that smoking was a choice freely made by consumers went 
a long way toward explaining regulators’ hands-off approach to tobacco 
                                                                                                                          
25 Brandt observes that the antismoking movement early in the twentieth century “paradoxically 
made [the cigarette] a powerful symbol of modernity and burnished its appeal.”  Id. at 67. 
26 Id. at 100. 
27 “The triumph of the cigarette did not occur by serendipity.  Even as smoking seemed to fit with 
a modern consumer age, the very development of consumption was carefully and artfully constructed 
by powerful corporations with extensive resources.”  Id. at 67. 
28 The industry’s aggressive advertising campaigns took full advantage of the emerging field of 
psychology in shaping public opinion.  See id. at 77–78 (“The public must be given ideas as to what it 
should like . . . . The old sales bywords ‘know your customer’s needs’ have been remolded to ‘know 
what your customer should need and then educate him on those needs.’”).  One pervasive advertising 
technique was to encourage consumers, particularly women, to smoke instead of snacking, so as to 
maintain a “slender figure.”  Id. at 72 (citing ROBERT SOBEL, THEY SATISFY: THE CIGARETTE IN 
AMERICAN LIFE 101 (1978)).  Brandt describes a 1928 ad for American Tobacco’s Lucky Strike 
brand—part of a broader ad campaign in the same vein—that showed the famed aviator Amelia Earhart 
and included the statement, “‘For a Slender Figure—Reach for a Lucky Instead of a Sweet.’”  Id. 
(citing ROBERT SOBEL, THEY SATISFY: THE CIGARETTE IN AMERICAN LIFE 101 (1978)).  Not only did 
the ad invoke the fashionable figure of the day, but it also made use of a celebrity testimonial to 
promote the product. 
29 The source of this phrase was Edward Bernays, Sigmund Freud’s nephew, who came to the 
United States and emerged as one of the first public relations experts.  Id. at 80–81.  Bernays took a 
position with American Tobacco in the late 1920s and launched the campaign that he called 
“engineering of consent.”  Id. at 81, 87–88. 
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products.30  American public opinion has remained equally hands-off, 
endorsing the right of adults to choose whether or not to smoke.31  
Moreover, the tobacco industry came to rely upon assumption of the risk as 
a standard defense—and a largely successful one—in personal injury 
lawsuits brought by smokers.32  Philip Morris USA has incorporated a 
version of assumption of the risk into its public position on smoking and 
health, currently set forth on its web site, which encourages smokers to 
make their own choices: 
There is no safe cigarette.  Philip Morris USA agrees 
with the overwhelming medical and scientific consensus that 
cigarette smoking causes lung cancer, heart disease, 
emphysema and other serious diseases in smokers.  Smokers 
are far more likely to develop serious diseases than 
non-smokers. 
These have been, and continue to be, the messages of the 
U.S. Surgeon General and public health authorities 
worldwide.  Smokers and potential smokers should rely on 
these messages when deciding whether or not to smoke.33 
The issues of consent and assumption of the risk reflect the complex 
responses of the public to perceived risks, responses related to numerous 
factors, not merely mathematical risks.34 
Brandt’s discussion of the social factors related to smoking during the 
twentieth century supports his position that the tobacco industry operated 
out of self-interest and disregard for the health of the entire population, 
both consumers of cigarettes and nonsmokers exposed to their smoke.  Few 
would dispute this assessment in a long-term sense, although other 
commentators have examined the industry through a more neutral lens.35  
                                                                                                                          
30 See infra Part II.C. 
31 Robert A. Kagan & William P. Nelson, The Politics of Tobacco Regulation in the United 
States, in REGULATING TOBACCO 11, 35 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2001) (“There 
is no sign that most Americans wish to prohibit the manufacture and sale of tobacco products, except 
for sales to juveniles . . . .”). 
32 See, e.g., Glenn Collins, Cigarette Makers Win Verdict in Suit by a Smoker’s Family, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 24, 1996, at A8, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (explaining that an Indiana 
jury placed blame for injuries on the plaintiff because he made a choice to smoke with full knowledge 
of the hazards); Milo Geyelin, RJR’s Tobacco Unit Wins a Big Victory: Jury Clears It of Blame in 
Smoker’s Death—Wall Street Had Scrutinized Florida Trial as Signal On Future Litigation, WALL ST. 
J., May 6, 1997, at A3, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File (describing a Florida jury’s 
placing of blame for injuries on the plaintiff, who had begun smoking at age 15). 
33 Philip Morris USA, http://www.philipmorrisusa.com/en/cms/Products/Cigarettes/Health_ 
Issues/Cigarette_Smoking_and_Disease/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 22, 2008). 
34 See John Slade, Marketing Policies, in REGULATING TOBACCO 72, 74–75 (Robert L. Rabin & 
Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2001) (discussing studies on the public’s perception of risk). 
35 For example, in Ashes to Ashes, Kluger focused to a large extent on the entrepreneurial nature 
of the early tobacco executives and their efforts in developing a large multinational industry.  See 
KLUGER, supra note 6 (describing those individuals responsible for the development of the tobacco 
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Still, Brandt’s public-health oriented approach is well-served by his 
argument that these social factors created a perfect storm for the tensions 
among science, governmental regulators, and the judicial system. 
B.  The Rise of the “New Epidemiology” 
The major focus and most important aspect of The Cigarette Century is 
Brandt’s examination of the historical development of public health 
measures to identify and evaluate health risks—such as those posed by 
smoking and by environmental tobacco smoke (ETS)—that arose slowly 
over time.  Brandt repeatedly demonstrates the ways in which smoking-
related illness is significantly different from the infectious and 
communicable illnesses that preoccupied the public health community 
throughout most of the twentieth century.36  Those latter illnesses, such as 
influenza, were borne by biological organisms and typically characterized 
by acute symptoms arising soon after exposure.37  In contrast, smoking-
related illness and other illnesses resulting from toxic exposures typically 
manifest in symptoms only after a latency period of months, years, or even 
decades from the time of initial exposure, and often well after exposure has 
ceased.38 
In the mid-twentieth century, as detailed by Brandt, researchers turned 
their attention to the causes of chronic illness in the population.39  A 1938 
study derived from family data suggested a statistical relationship between 
smoking and a reduction in life span, with greater reduction occurring in 
persons who smoked more.40  But ascertaining whether a causal connection 
existed between smoking and certain illnesses was a much more difficult 
endeavor.  Thus, the public health community sought a new investigatory 
strategy that culminated in what Brandt refers to as the “new 
epidemiology.”41  In the strongest section of The Cigarette Century, Brandt 
explains the shift in epidemiological inquiry away from acute organism-
                                                                                                                          
industry); cf. Kagan & Nelson, supra note 31, at 15 (“Many of the distinctive features of American 
tobacco policy not only appear to be roughly in line with American public opinion . . . but also in tune 
with enduring characteristics of American political culture.”). 
36 See, e.g., BRANDT, supra note 3, at 122 (“[I]t took a dramatic epidemiologic transition—the 
decline of infectious disease as a dominant cause of mortality—to make the harms of cigarette smoking 
fully explicit.”). 
37 In the 1940s, “[a]ccording to many investigators, proving causation now required the 
identification of a ‘specific’ mechanism under laboratory conditions” to reveal the disease-causing 
organisms.  Id. at 119. 
38 For example, latency periods for manifestation of asbestos-related illness typically run 
anywhere from ten to thirty years.  Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1084–85 
(5th Cir. 1973) (discussing the findings reported in Selikoff, Churg, & Hammond, The Occurrence of 
Asbestosis Among Industrial Insulation Workers, 132 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCIS. 139, 146–47 (1965)). 
39 Brandt observes that “[t]he shift in patterns of disease and the increase in life expectancies 
made new risks possible—and ultimately visible.”  BRANDT, supra note 3, at 122. 
40 Id. at 126–27 (citing Raymond Pearl, Tobacco Smoking and Longevity, 87 SCI. 216 (1938)). 
41 Id. at 123. 
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induced illness to chronic illnesses with potentially multiple causes.  Thus, 
Brandt states:  
Identifying the health risks of a particular behavior like 
smoking fit [the old] model poorly.  The length of time 
before the disease developed was protracted . . . [and] the 
large number of intervening variables confounded the 
emerging notion of specific causality.  Everyone “exposed” 
did not get the disease, and most did not . . . .42   
This new epidemiology took advantage of statistical comparisons between 
people who had cancer and a control group of those who did not, 
attempting to determine what factors may have been responsible for the 
development of cancer.43  The new studies attempted to account for the 
latency period and the possibility of intervening and confounding 
variables.  The results of the studies provided concrete evidence of the 
relationship between smoking cigarettes and various illnesses.  Still, such 
data did not provide the level of causal proof in individual cases that the 
law generally requires.44 
Brandt documents the tobacco industry’s strong reaction to the studies, 
which included a public relations strategy for creating scientific 
controversy.45  This was no small feat: By 1950 the news media published 
an increasing stream of articles reporting studies that showed a relationship 
between smoking and lung cancer.  Working collectively, in 1953 the 
cigarette manufacturers began to put into place their public relations plan, 
which operated on several fronts.  The key approach was to bring into their 
fold scientists skeptical of the studies showing a cigarette-cancer 
connection and using them to focus public attention on what the industry 
characterized as “controversy.”46  This approach blossomed into the 
establishment of official-sounding “bureaus” and “committees,” all of 
                                                                                                                          
42 Id. at 120. 
43 Id. at 123. 
44 For a discussion of the relationship between the new epidemiology and current toxic tort 
litigation, see infra, Part III.  See also Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Toxic Reproductive and Genetic 
Hazards in the Workplace: Challenging the Myths of the Tort and Workers’ Compensation Systems, 60 
FORDHAM L. REV. 843, 888–89 (1992) (discussing the same issues in the context of reproductive and 
genetic injuries).  Brandt notes that correlations between smoking and various negative outcomes that 
were observed in the clinical setting in the early part of the twentieth century eventually were validated 
through other, more acceptable studies.  Of the early clinical observations, he states: 
These clinical observations of the impact of smoking are, in retrospect, quite 
impressive.  Almost all the risks that would later come to be attributed to smoking 
had been well documented by clinicians in the first decades of the century.  Even the 
risks of passive exposure to cigarette smoke had been well articulated.  
BRANDT, supra note 3, at 128 (footnote omitted). 
45 BRANDT, supra note 3, at 160. 
46 Id. at 167. 
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which were nothing more than industry mouthpieces.47  The industry also 
launched an aggressive new advertising strategy focused on the alleged 
benefits of filter cigarettes.48 
Brandt’s discussion of the creation of the Tobacco Industry Research 
Committee (TIRC) provides the reader with insight into the science 
strategy of the industry at mid-century.  He shows that the industry’s 
professed interest in demonstrating scientific controversy was less about 
science than about obfuscation of scientific data,49 and that the industry’s 
purpose in establishing the TIRC was to support the industry’s existing 
position of scientific controversy.  While the TIRC purported to conduct 
independent—and presumably neutral—scientific research,50 Brandt 
                                                                                                                          
47 For example, in 1953, R.J. Reynolds created the “Bureau of Scientific Information” to 
challenge the scientific studies showing a connection between smoking and cancer.  Id.  The industry 
collectively established the Tobacco Industry Research Committee (TIRC) and publicly announced that 
the TIRC would conduct research into the health effects of smoking, presumably to give the public 
reason to believe that the industry was committed to providing a safe product.  See id. at 170–71 
(providing a background of the establishment of the TIRC). 
48 The cigarette manufacturers retreated from their earlier advertising campaigns touting the 
quasi-health benefits of their particular brands, some of which had made use of physicians.  During the 
1930s, the manufacturers had made varied claims about the positive aspects of cigarettes.  See KLUGER, 
supra note 6, at 77 (describing American Tobacco’s promotion of Lucky Strikes as appetite 
suppressants: “Reach for a Lucky instead of a sweet”); id. at 86 (describing R.J. Reynolds’s promotion 
of Camels using the image of a pilot to suggest cigarettes’ tranquilizing effect: “It Takes Steady Nerves 
to Fly the Mail at Night. . . . That’s why I smoke Camels.  And I smoke plenty!  Camels never ruffle or 
jangle my nerves, and I like their mild, rich flavor.”); id. at 87 (discussing R.J. Reynolds’s promotion 
of Camels’ stimulating or energizing effect: “You Get a Lift With a Camel;” “A Harmless Restoration 
of the Flow of Natural Body Energy”); id. at 88 (describing R.J. Reynolds’s promotion of Camels as a 
means of improving digestion: “For Digestion’s sake, smoke Camels!”); id. at 117 (referring to 
American Tobacco’s promotion of Pall Malls as a method of reducing throat scratch: “gentles the 
smoke”); see also BRANDT, supra note 3, at 93 (mentioning that Lorillard also promoted Old Golds as 
gentle on one’s throat: “Not  a Cough in a Carload”).  But in the 1950s, in apparent reaction to the 
health studies, the industry took a different tack by touting the health protections of filters, such as 
Lorillard’s “Micronite” filter used in the Kent brand.  See KLUGER, supra note 6, at 151 (describing 
how Lorillard promoted Kents as “The Greatest Health Protection in Cigarette History”); id. at 155 
(noting Liggett & Myers’s use of the actor Fredric March to promote its filter-tip L&M brand, saying 
“L&M Filters Are Just What the Doctor Ordered!”).  Brandt states that this host of health claims 
demonstrated that the industry sought to make its product something “that could be virtually all things 
to all people.”  BRANDT, supra note 3, at 100.  It turned out that the Kent Micronite filter contained a 
form of asbestos, so whether or not the filter reduced the amount of nicotine and tar that reached the 
smoker, it created a different health hazard.  See Quickel v. Lorillard, Inc., No. 95-5255, 1999 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 23453, at *4–*6, *24–*26 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 1999) (holding admissible expert evidence of 
causation in a case claiming that asbestos in Micronite filter cigarettes caused decedent’s mesothelioma 
death). 
49 BRANDT, supra note 3, at 173.  Among other facts, the first executive director of the TIRC had 
no scientific background, and the first full-time chair of the organization was a long-time veteran of 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Company.  Id. 
50 A press release naming Timothy V. Hartnett, the former president of Brown & Williamson, as 
the first chair stated that the purpose of the TIRC was “to sponsor research into all phases of tobacco 
use and health.”  Press Release, Tobacco Industry Research Committee (July 1, 1954), available at 
http://tobaccodocuments.org/ctr/11310600-0601.html.  Hartnett himself stated: “The tobacco industry 
is determined to find the answers to the public's questions about smoking and health.  The appointment 
of a full-time chairman completes an organization dedicated to carrying on comprehensive and 
objective scientific and statistical research to establish the facts and report them to the public.”  Id.  
Furthermore, the press release outlined  the following as the position of the TIRC: 
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presents ample support for his assertions that the TIRC was created to 
support and promote the industry’s position that smoking cigarettes was no 
more harmful than any other aspect of life.  Already predisposed to 
rejecting the increasing scientific knowledge of the connection between 
smoking and cancer,51 the TIRC and the industry adhered to this position 
for decades in the face of mounting evidence of causation.52 
Indeed, Brandt asserts that the TIRC did not really study the effects of 
smoking and health in the 1950s at all.53  Rather, the TIRC’s strategy was 
to learn of ongoing studies elsewhere and develop a plan for public rebuttal 
the instant that results were released—and sometimes even before they 
were released.54  The TIRC was not just focused on using the media; it 
used the medical profession as well.  Beginning in 1958, the TIRC 
disseminated a periodical entitled “Tobacco and Health” free of charge to 
the medical and dental professions, with the theme that insufficient 
scientific evidence existed to demonstrate a connection between smoking 
and lung cancer.55 
Another pivotal public health development detailed by Brandt is the 
                                                                                                                          
It is an obligation of the Tobacco Industry Research Committee at this time to 
remind the public of these essential points: 
1.  There is no conclusive scientific proof of a link between smoking and cancer. 
2. Medical research points to many possible causes of cancer.  Statistics 
indicating a relationship between smoking and disease could apply with equal force 
to many other aspects of modern life. 
. . . 
5.  The millions of people who derive pleasure and satisfaction from smoking can 
be reassured that every scientific means will be used to get all the facts as soon as 
possible. 
Id. 
51 See BRANDT, supra note 3, at 175–83 for a discussion of the appointment of Clarence Cook 
Little, a geneticist and eugenicist who elevated laboratory research over other scientific investigation, 
as the first scientific director of the TIRC.  Little was a self-proclaimed skeptic about causal 
relationships between exposures and illnesses and had focused his own research on heredity and cancer.  
Id. at 175–76, 179. 
52 This mounting evidence included an extensive study in 1957 of autopsies of deceased smokers.  
Id. at 187 (citing, among other sources, Oscar Auerbach et al., Changes in the Bronchial Epithelium in 
Relation to Smoking and Cancer of the Lung: A Report of Progress, 256 N. ENG. J. MED. 104 (1957)).  
The research program put into place by TIRC scientific director Clarence Cook Little was one, in 
Brandt’s view, that not only was anti-epidemiology, but was designed to prevent resolution of the 
precise questions the TIRC allegedly was established to answer.  “Little and his . . . colleagues 
constructed a basic science research program into aspects of carcinogenesis that had little or no 
potential to resolve the question that the TIRC had promised the American public would be at the 
center of attention: do cigarettes cause disease?”  Id. at 182.  Ironically, the TIRC at the same time 
criticized the studies that did show a causal connection as lacking the experimental scientific rigor that 
the TIRC itself did not embrace.  In fact, the research that the industry did conduct seemed to confirm 
the very studies that the industry was attempting to refute.  Id. at 199 (referencing industry studies of 
carcinogenic constituents of tobacco smoke); KLUGER, supra note 6, at 362–63 (discussing industry-
funded animal studies showing precancerous lesions, which resulted in the researcher being dropped 
from the program). 
53 See BRANDT, supra note 3, at 186–87 (discussing TIRC’s strategy of avoiding conducting 
empirical studies). 
54 Id. at 195. 
55 Id. at 196–97. 
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emergence of scientific evidence demonstrating the relationship of 
environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) to disease in nonsmokers.  Several 
factors were significant in bringing public attention to ETS.  One was the 
role of grassroots public health advocacy groups in raising media 
awareness of ETS in the 1970s and 1980s.56  Although researchers had 
difficulty measuring exposure to ETS, many of the studies conducted on 
nonsmoking spouses of smokers found elevated rates of lung cancer and 
cardiovascular disease in these subjects.57  The grassroots organizations 
also focused their efforts on urging smoking bans in the states.58  The 
industry’s response to the ETS studies mirrored its earlier response to 
studies on smoking—attacks on the scientific studies59 and diversions to 
other environmental pollutants as possible causes of illness.60 
In Brandt’s assessment, by the 1980s, epidemiology had become an 
accepted and important tool in the public health arsenal to determine the 
causal connection between cigarette smoke and disease.  He observes: 
First, it was no longer possible, as it had been in the 1950s, to 
denigrate epidemiology and statistics.  These elements of 
medical science had grown to be trusted influences on both 
public opinion and policy making.  Second, the industry’s 
own loss of credibility . . . made the media and the public 
unwilling to accept industry attacks as scientifically 
legitimate. . . . Finally, American society had become far 
more health-conscious since the 1960s—and more risk 
averse.61 
For example, when smoking on aircrafts became a regulatory battleground 
in the ETS movement, the industry was on the losing end, culminating in 
the prohibition of smoking on all domestic flights in 1990.62 
As a historian, one of Brandt’s major purposes in writing The 
Cigarette Century was to conduct an “examination of those particular 
social processes by which a culture constitutes and assesses the risks of 
life—and death.”63  His ultimate goal is clear—to avert a potential global 
health catastrophe in smoking-related illness by illuminating the forces that 
have allowed the cigarette to remain a powerful consumer product despite 
its health hazards.  This is a most ambitious goal, and his narrative 
sometimes reads more like a piece of advocacy than a social science 
                                                                                                                          
56 Id. at 288.  
57 See id. at 284–85 (detailing the procedures and results of several ETS studies in different 
countries). 
58 Id. at 289. 
59 Id. at 292. 
60 Id. at 293. 
61 Id. at 295. 
62 Id. at 305. 
63 Id. at 13. 
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treatise.  But the greatest value of The Cigarette Century lies in Brandt’s 
examination of the factors and events in the public health community that 
led to the health crisis he documents.  Thus, as a historian of science, 
Brandt is most interested in the role tobacco played in revolutionizing 
epidemiological study to address a new set of public health problems—
those involving exposures to toxic substances and latent illness.64  One area 
that would have completed his medical and epidemiological analysis 
would have been a discussion of studies on harm reduction in smokers and 
the respective effectiveness of methods such as nicotine reduction in 
cigarettes, smoking cessation, and nicotine substitutes.  It is likely, 
however, that that particular chapter in the history of the cigarette has yet 
to be clearly written in the scientific literature.65 
C.  The Rough Road to Regulation 
Brandt also examines the role of public health officials in pursuing 
regulation of the tobacco industry.  He tracks this topic from the early 
1960s, through the actions of the country’s chief public health official, the 
Surgeon General, and the industry’s efforts to thwart regulation.  Once 
again, Brandt presents these events as pivotal in the history of public health 
in the United States.  The first significant development was the committee 
established by Luther Terry, President Kennedy’s Surgeon General, for the 
purpose of determining the “nature and magnitude of the health effects of 
smoking”66 and, ultimately, providing recommendations for action.67  The 
report that the committee issued found that smoking caused significant 
illness in the United States.68  
The release of the Surgeon General’s report in January 1964 
constituted a watershed event in the move toward health-based tobacco 
regulation.  Brandt emphasizes that the Surgeon General’s report was 
instrumental in ushering in a salutary new stage in the history of public 
                                                                                                                          
64 See infra notes 151–96 and accompanying text for a discussion of the relationship between 
Brandt’s narrative and the subsequent course of toxic tort law. 
65 For a public policy orientated survey of smoking cessation methods and issues, see Kenneth E. 
Warner, Reducing Harm to Smokers: Methods, Their Effectiveness, and the Role of Policy, in 
REGULATING TOBACCO 111 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2001). 
66 BRANDT, supra note 3, at 221 (quoting Surgeon General’s Advisory Committee on Smoking 
and Health, THE NATURE, PURPOSE, AND SUGGESTED FORMULATION OF THE STUDY OF THE HEALTH 
EFFECTS OF SMOKING, PHASE I (1962)). 
67 Id.  
68 Brandt states: “For the seventy million regular smokers in the United States, the report of the 
committee’s findings confirmed their worst fears.  It told them that the death rate from lung cancer was 
1,000 percent higher among men who smoked cigarettes than among nonsmokers.”  Id. at 224.  The 
report also concluded that smokers were at a significantly higher risk than nonsmokers of non-
malignant lung conditions.  Id.; see also id. at 229 (“At the press conference announcing the 
committee’s findings, Terry was asked whether he would now advise a patient to stop smoking.  His 
answer was an unequivocal ‘yes.’” (citation omitted)). 
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health.69  But transforming the committee’s conclusions into government 
action proved problematic, largely as a result of the tobacco industry’s 
continued portrayal of the science as controversial.70  Brandt details the 
difficult, tortuous road toward regulating an industry with substantial 
political support and an unyielding commitment to creating the illusion of 
scientific controversy.  One fact that demonstrates the tenacity of the 
industry and its product is that the aftermath of the release of the report did 
not see any significant immediate decline in smoking in the United 
States.71  More problematic, perhaps, was the fact that the Office of the 
Surgeon General did not have the immediate ability to launch the anti-
smoking initiatives that the report seemed to mandate.72  The report proved 
pivotal, nevertheless, as the Office of the Surgeon General thenceforth 
assumed an active role in public health matters.73 
Regulation of tobacco products proved elusive from the very start.  
Although the tobacco industry had come under the scrutiny of the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) as early as the 1930s because of its advertising 
campaigns promoting the alleged health benefits of smoking,74 the industry 
remained—and continues to this day to remain—virtually unregulated.75  It 
was not until 1965 that Congress mandated a health warning on cigarette 
packaging.  The resulting legislation required the placement of a warning 
on packages of cigarettes stating, “Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be 
Hazardous to Your Health.”76  According to Brandt, the tobacco industry’s 
supporters engineered the legislation to protect the manufacturers from tort 
judgments and to assist them in advancing their primary defense to tort 
                                                                                                                          
69 In the future, “[r]esolving controversies in science, medicine, and public health . . . would 
increasingly require the integration of scientific data from a wide range of experiments, studies, and 
clinical observations.”  Id. at 238.  The new protocol arising from the process developed by the 
Surgeon General’s Advisory Committee in producing its report consisted primarily of (1) eliminating 
conflicts of interest among the investigators and evaluators; (2) achieving consensus among 
participants with diverse scientific proclivities; and (3) providing a means to resolve conflicts among 
the group.  Id.  A key to this process was conducting a comprehensive review of the existing 
experimental data, epidemiological studies, and clinical observations.  Id.  With regard to the 
relationship between smoking and adverse health effects, there was a remarkable consistency among 
the results of the studies employing different scientific methodologies.  Id. at 228. 
70 Id. at 231. 
71 Although cigarette sales dropped in early 1964, they immediately rebounded, breaking records 
for sales, cigarette use, and industry profits.  Id. at 237.  Smoking levels remained strong through 1973.  
Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 239.  “The 1964 report remains a signal contribution not only to the history of the 
cigarette but to the history of public health.”  Id. 
74 Id. at 243; see also KLUGER, supra note 6, at 189 (describing the 1958 attempt to regulate tar 
and nicotine in cigarettes under the auspices of the FTC). 
75 See BRANDT, supra note 3, at 273 (noting that cigarettes were expressly excluded from 
regulation under the Fair Labeling and Packaging Act of 1966, the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, 
and the Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972). 
76 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 4, 79 Stat. 282–
83 (1965). 
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actions—assumption of the risk.77  Subsequent legislation in 1969 changed 
the warning to state that cigarette smoking “[i]s [d]angerous.”78  In 1984, 
the labels were modified again to the multiple, rotating warnings currently 
in use.79  By any standard, this so-called regulation was minimal at best. 
The major test of the tobacco industry’s strategy on regulation 
occurred in 1992.  In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., the United States 
Supreme Court ruled on whether the plaintiff’s product liability claims 
were preempted by the 1965 and 1969 labeling acts.80  In a plurality 
opinion, the Court held that the failure-to-warn claims were expressly 
preempted,81 but that claims for misrepresentation, express warranty, and 
negligent research and testing would be allowed to go forward.82  The 
decision thwarted the industry’s strategy to use regulation as a shield for all 
tort actions.  Instead, Cipollone allowed the courts—and common-law tort 
actions in particular—to serve as a vehicle for redress for people claiming 
to be harmed by the health risks of smoking.  Brandt states: “The industry 
had long feared the emergence of such aggressively contested  
litigation . . . . In the courts, antitobacco advocates certainly had not found 
a level playing field; nonetheless they had found a field.”83  The other side 
of this transition to tort law was the tobacco industry’s insistence that the 
judicial system was wrongly allowed to legislate in an area where 
Congress had declined to do so.84  The industry’s position was one aspect 
of a growing tort reform movement committed to limiting or eliminating 
tort litigation.85 
Brandt argues that Cipollone signaled a “critical transition” in the war 
against the tobacco industry.86  Previously, the industry had adamantly 
denied—at least publicly—the health risks of smoking, acceding only that 
there might be a controversy over the relationship between smoking and 
disease.  The industry’s new position was an admission that smoking was a 
“risk factor” in the development of lung cancer, but that no proof existed 
                                                                                                                          
77 BRANDT, supra note 3, at 254, 257. 
78 Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 4, 84 Stat. 87–88 (1970). 
79 Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. No. 98-474, §§ 4(a)(1)–(b)(1), 98 Stat. 2200–
02 (1984). 
80 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 508 (1992) (plurality opinion).  For a discussion of 
the impact of the Cipollone decision on subsequent product preemption jurisprudence, see infra Part 
IV. 
81 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524.  For a discussion of express preemption in this context, see Jean 
Macchiaroli Eggen, Sense or Sensibility?: Toxic Product Liability Under State Law After Cipollone 
and Medtronic, 2 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 1, 4–11 (1996). 
82 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524–29. 
83 BRANDT, supra note 3, at 353. 
84 Id. 
85 See, e.g., Product Liability Reform Act of 1997, S. 648, 105th Cong., tit. III, § 2(a)(4) (1997) 
(referring to the tort system in “Findings” as resulting in “excessive, unpredictable, and often arbitrary 
damage awards and unfair allocation of liability”). 
86 Brandt expansively calls it “a critical transition in both the legal and social history of the 
cigarette in American life.”  BRANDT, supra note 3, at 352. 
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that smoking actually caused lung cancer.87 
This shift in the industry’s position opened the door for another federal 
effort at regulation, this time by the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA).88  Brandt chronicles the efforts of the FDA to regulate tobacco 
products, culminating in the United States Supreme Court’s 2000 decision, 
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., which struck down 
provisions regulating cigarettes as nicotine delivery devices.89  Brandt 
identifies several circumstances that created a climate conducive to FDA 
regulatory efforts.  First, he notes that the industry’s long-standing strategy 
of creating controversy, criticizing statistical science, and denying the 
harms of cigarettes was no longer persuasive.  Both the media and the FDA 
focused on the tobacco industry’s own research—mostly on so-called 
“safer cigarettes”—which confirmed the addictive qualities of nicotine.90  
When the top executives of the major tobacco companies appeared before a 
Congressional committee, their denials of the addictive nature of nicotine 
rang hollow to a public that had been educated by the media about the 
results of the scientific studies.91 
Second, Brandt credits the release of thousands of previously 
confidential tobacco industry documents with significantly changing the 
regulatory climate.92  When certain industry documents came into the 
possession of Stanton Glantz at the University of California at San 
Francisco, he made them public, revealing the cognitive dissonance 
between the industry’s position over the years and its internal knowledge 
                                                                                                                          
87 Id. at 341. 
88 For a detailed insider’s description of the FDA’s efforts, see DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF 
INTENT: A GREAT AMERICAN BATTLE WITH A DEADLY INDUSTRY (2001) (describing in minute detail 
his participation in the FDA’s efforts to regulate the tobacco industry during the 1990s). See also 
BRANDT, supra note 3, at 579 (referring to former FDA Commissioner Kessler as his major source on 
the FDA’s efforts to regulate the tobacco industry).  
89 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). The trigger for FDA 
regulation of cigarettes is whether the product was “intended to affect the structure or any function of 
the body . . . .”  21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) (2000).  The difficulty with cigarettes was that they are 
combination products, both a device and a drug (nicotine), which are regulated separately in the FDCA.  
The FDA viewed the cigarette as a drug delivery device for nicotine.  Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 
127.  In the mid-1990s, the FDA Commissioner, David Kessler, became concerned over the evidence 
that nicotine levels in cigarettes were rising after an earlier period of decline.  See KESSLER, supra note 
88, at 161–64 (discussing the investigation into the manipulation of nicotine levels in cigarettes and 
providing a very personal and detailed account of his efforts to regulate cigarettes). 
90 BRANDT, supra note 3, at 365. 
91 Id. at 366–67. 
92 Initially, whistleblowers who were former employees of the tobacco industry came forward 
with testimony and documentary evidence detailing the industry’s decades-long knowledge of the 
hazards of cigarettes.  Id. at 369–70 (discussing Merrell Williams, a former paralegal for Brown & 
Williamson’s law firm, who stole and released more than 4000 pages of documents); id. at 375–84 
(discussing Jeffrey Wigand, a former research scientist for Brown & Williamson, who provided the 
media with information regarding manipulation of nicotine levels in cigarettes).  See generally 
MICHAEL OREY, ASSUMING THE RISK: THE MAVERICKS, THE LAWYERS, AND THE WHISTLE-BLOWERS 
WHO BEAT BIG TOBACCO (1999) (using interviews and trial records to tell the story of the exposure of 
tobacco industry practices). 
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and practices.93  Indeed, the availability of the industry documents 
dramatically changed the entire debate over the hazards of both smoking 
and ETS, reaching into courtrooms around the country as well as the halls 
of Congress. 
In seeking to regulate tobacco products, the FDA took the position that 
it had the discretion to determine whether to regulate cigarettes as either 
medical devices or drugs, based on the theory that they were nicotine 
delivery devices.94  The resulting device rules were child-centered, 
involving sales and advertising.95  The industry challenged the proposed 
rules, arguing that the FDA had no jurisdiction to promulgate them.  
Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court agreed with the industry,96 
holding that Congress had never intended to grant authority to the FDA to 
regulate tobacco products.97 
Brandt’s discussion of regulation ends pessimistically, but he may 
have given up on this possibility too soon.  In 2008, the prospect of FDA 
regulation of cigarettes looms much larger, this time with the support of 
Philip Morris USA which originally came out in favor of FDA regulation 
in 2003,98 presumably with a renewed eye toward preemption of common-
law tort actions.  In July 2008, the House of Representatives, by an 
overwhelming majority, passed a bill that would regulate, though not 
                                                                                                                          
93 BRANDT, supra note 3, at 371–72.  See generally STANTON A. GLANTZ ET AL., THE CIGARETTE 
PAPERS 30–32 (1996) (describing tobacco industry documents and including edited versions of some of 
the documents).  A vast collection of tobacco industry documents is stored in the Legacy Tobacco 
Documents Library at the University of California at San Francisco.  Legacy Tobacco Documents 
Library, http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu (last visited Sept. 12, 2008). 
94 Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 129; see FDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 360j(e) (2000) (“The Secretary 
may by regulation require that a device be restricted to sale, distribution, or use . . . upon such other 
conditions as [the FDA] may prescribe in such regulation, if, because of its potentiality for harmful 
effect . . . [the FDA] determines that there cannot otherwise be reasonable assurance of its safety and 
effectiveness.”).  
95 Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 126. 
96 Id. at 133.  The FDA had documented in detail the health risks associated with cigarettes.  The 
Court said that if the regulations for devices were intended to apply to tobacco products, the 
documented hazards would have required the FDA to ban cigarettes from the market.  Id. at 135, 137.  
Congress had effectively prohibited this when it enacted a provision that stated:  “The marketing of 
tobacco constitutes one of the greatest basic industries of the United States with ramifying activities 
which directly affect interstate and foreign commerce at every point, and stable conditions therein are 
necessary to the general welfare.”  7 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2000).  Thus, an absolute ban would “plainly 
contradict congressional policy.”  Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 139.  The Court held that the 
FDA’s attempt to circumvent this problem was an improper application of the regulations.  Id. at 140. 
97 Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 126.  The Court examined the 1938 FDCA and found nothing 
in the act or in the legislative history to suggest that Congress granted the FDA authority over tobacco.  
Moreover, the FDA had repeatedly stated over the years that it did not have such authority, and this 
worked against its argument before the Court.  Id. at 144–46.  At least in partial reliance on this 
position, Congress has declined to enact any legislation to specifically grant jurisdiction to the FDA.  
Id. at 145–46.  When Congress did enact tobacco-specific legislation—in particular, the cigarette 
labeling acts—it also declined to grant authority to regulate to the FDA, keeping that authority for 
itself.  Id. at 149. 
98  Philip Morris CEO Tells House Panel FDA Should Get Power to Regulate Tobacco, TOXICS 
L. REP., June 6, 2003, at 590. 
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eliminate, nicotine in cigarettes and ban flavored (but not menthol) 
cigarettes.99  The legislation was developed in part through an agreement 
with Philip Morris.100 Other cigarette manufacturers are less enthusiastic 
than Philip Morris about the prospect of regulation.  For example, a 
representative of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company expressed concern 
about his company having a “competitive disadvantage” in an era of 
standardized cigarette ingredients.101  The prospect of FDA regulation has 
raised a question in some public health circles as to whether regulation of 
cigarettes would create the erroneous and oddly counterintuitive 
impression that smoking is safe.102  At the present time, however, Brandt’s 
concluding point103 on regulation continues to be true:  More than forty 
years after the first Surgeon General’s report on smoking, no 
comprehensive regulation of cigarettes is in place. 
D.  The Era of Tobacco Litigation 
The disclosure of the industry documents paved the way for the 1998 
Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) between the tobacco industry and the 
states.104  Brandt examines the relationship between the failed FDA 
regulations and the efforts of the states to address the health aspects of 
smoking using innovative litigation.  In 1994, the state of Mississippi filed 
the first such suit against the tobacco industry, claiming that the state’s 
taxpayers had suffered losses associated with public expenditures, such as 
through the Medicaid program, for smoking-related illness.105  Moreover, 
the suit included a public nuisance claim seeking forward-looking 
injunctive relief to abate the nuisance perpetrated by the industry, 
                                                                                                                          
99 Stephanie Saul, House Votes to Rgulate Tobacco as a Drug, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2008, at C2 
(correction appended).  
100 Id. (stating that the bill was partly the result of negotiations with Philip Morris, but that not all 
tobacco companies supported it).  
101 See Gardiner Harris, Path to Tobacco Bill Includes Compromise and Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 17, 2007, at A14, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (quoting R.J. Reynolds 
representative as stating that the proposed regulation would make it too difficult to “communicate 
product differences” to smokers, and reporting that cigarette makers object to the competitive 
advantage regulation would give to Philip Morris, in its dominant position in the market); Gregory 
Lopes, Senate Bill to Let FDA Regulate Tobacco; Agency Could Limit Ads, Curb Tar and Nicotine, 
WASH. TIMES, July 17, 2007, at C8, available at LEXIS, News Library, WTIMES File (quoting a 
representative of R.J. Reynolds as stating that “[t]he advertising restrictions in the bill are anti-
competitive”). 
102 See Harris, supra note 101 (reporting testimony by FDA Commissioner Andrew von 
Eschenbach that the FDA should not be put in a position to decide whether cigarettes are safe). 
103 See BRANDT, supra note 3, at 396–97 (quoting Republican Congressman J.C. Watts as stating 
that “[t]he FDA seems to be interested in doing everything except what they are responsible for”). 
104 See infra notes 118–26 and accompanying text. 
105 BRANDT, supra note 3, at 414.  The federal government filed a major action against the 
tobacco industry as well, which was part reimbursement suit and part civil RICO action.  See United 
States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006) (holding that Philip Morris had 
intended to defraud American citizens with respect to its statements regarding the health effects of 
smoking). 
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particularly toward children.106  Several other state suits followed.107 
In 1997, the attorneys general of the litigating states—with the 
exception of Minnesota—began negotiating with the tobacco companies to 
achieve a “global settlement” that would reach beyond the pending 
lawsuits.108  Brandt demonstrates that the industry’s concern for revelations 
in their now-public internal documents and compromises the industry had 
already made in some personal injury actions placed the industry in a weak 
position in the state suits.  That the industry would end up coming out 
ahead as a result of the ultimate settlement of these suits is an example of 
its tenacity, the continued popularity of its product, and the continuing 
inability of the public health community and the government to fashion a 
consistent approach to the public health threat of smoking. 
The 1997 negotiations led to the ill-fated first global settlement 
agreement.109  That agreement contained provisions that resembled the 
regulations the FDA was attempting to put into place, such as limitations 
on advertising and marketing.  Primarily, the industry agreed to reimburse 
the states for their costs for smoking-related illnesses and programs.  The 
agreement contained promises to fund and establish public health 
programs, as well as to allow the FDA to regulate nicotine if youth 
smoking did not decline to certain prescribed levels.110  Its most dramatic 
provisions involved limitations on tort litigation.  In exchange for the 
accessions of the industry, the parties agreed to cap damages in tobacco 
lawsuits, prohibit class actions, and ban punitive damages for any past 
conduct of the industry.111  The agreement did, however, require Congress 
to act for it to go into effect.112  Congressional disagreement, coupled with 
a looming trial deadline in the Mississippi suit,113 stymied the legislation, 
and it never materialized. 
Brandt demonstrates the split in the public health community that 
contributed significantly to the failure of the 1997 global settlement 
legislation.  One segment of the public health community resisted 
negotiation and settlement out of a belief that such an approach would 
benefit only the industry, not the public.114  In the context of the 1997 
agreement, this skepticism manifested itself in a resistance to limiting the 
remedial role of the tort system for tobacco-related injuries.115  In contrast, 
other segments of the public health community favored the settlement 
                                                                                                                          
106 BRANDT, supra note 3, at 414. 
107 Id. at 415. 
108 Id. at 420–21. 
109 Id. at 422.  
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 423. 
114 Id. at 424. 
115 Id. at 425. 
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because it represented, at long last, some form of tobacco regulation.116  In 
Congress, modifications of the agreement inevitably occurred, and 
ultimately the tobacco industry itself opposed the legislation.117 
Soon after the announcement of the 1997 global settlement agreement, 
Mississippi settled its suit against the industry, out of necessity, in the days 
immediately before it was scheduled to go to trial.118  Subsequently, 
Florida and Texas settled their suits; Minnesota settled during trial.119  
With the failure of the legislation in Congress, the other states that had 
filed similar actions negotiated the MSA that went into effect in 1998, but 
which bore little resemblance to the 1997 agreement.120  The MSA offered 
an opportunity for all states to sign onto the agreement, including those 
that had not commenced reimbursement lawsuits against the industry.121  
The top tobacco companies agreed to pay a sum of $206 billion over a 
period of twenty-five years to reimburse the states for their public 
expenditures.122  The companies further agreed to fund anti-smoking 
initiatives in the states and acquiesced to some restrictions in 
advertising.123  But, as Brandt points out, the provisions had no real teeth.  
Moreover, the MSA did not require the monies paid to the states to be used 
for anti-smoking campaigns—or even public health initiatives—and were 
treated by the states as “a windfall to governors and legislators with little 
interest in battling tobacco” for use in unrelated programs.124 
Brandt is at his best in illuminating the public health community’s 
controversy over these issues, but is less effective in detailing the subtleties 
of the legal positions.  Others have reported the events leading up to the 
MSA in detail,125 but Brandt’s contribution is his ability to place those 
                                                                                                                          
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 427–28. 
118 Id. at 423. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 432. 
121 Master Settlement Agreement (MSA), available at http://ag.ca.gov/tobacco/msa.php (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2008). 
122 Id.   
123 Id. 
124 BRANDT, supra note 3, at 432.  The CDC recommended that a minimum of twenty percent of 
each state’s payment be dedicated to an anti-smoking agenda, but Brandt reports that by 2005 only four 
percent had been used for those efforts.  Id. at 435.  Further, because the settlement was to be paid out 
over a period of twenty-five years, the states needed the continued health of the tobacco industry.  In 
Brandt’s words, “the deal had made the states dependent on tobacco revenues . . . [and p]artners with 
the tobacco industry.”  Id.  This situation is exacerbated by the practice of the states selling bond issues 
backed by future tobacco settlement payments.  Id. 
125 See, e.g., MARTHA A. DERTHICK, UP IN SMOKE: FROM LEGISLATION TO LITIGATION IN 
TOBACCO POLITICS 119–50 (2002) (describing the McCain Bill and congressional inaction leading up 
to the MSA); MICHAEL PERTSCHUK, SMOKE IN THEIR EYES: LESSONS IN MOVEMENT LEADERSHIP 
FROM THE TOBACCO WARS (2001) (recounting the tobacco industry’s resistance to all serious efforts to 
enact regulation in the three decades leading up to the MSA); DAN ZEGART, CIVIL WARRIORS: THE 
LEGAL SIEGE ON THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY (2000) (describing one lawyer’s tenacious battle against the 
tobacco industry). 
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events within the context of the history of public health in this country.  He 
argues that the resulting MSA was expedient for most players.  It protected 
the tobacco industry from the risks of taking the state cases to trial; it gave 
the states the revenues they sought, and the attorneys large fees and the 
high profiles they desired.  But, he says ruefully, “public health got the 
short end.”126 
Brandt’s discussion of personal injury litigation in the post-Cipollone 
era focuses primarily on the use of the class action device in two important 
mass tort cases, one brought by smokers claiming addiction to cigarettes,127 
the other by nonsmokers.128  Rather than retread the many legal 
developments that led up to and defined these cases, Brandt wisely chooses 
to place them in the light of the public health developments they represent.  
He also uses them to advance the argument that resorting to the courts was 
necessary to bring about some measure of regulation over the tobacco 
industry when traditional governmental regulation had failed. 
Thus, Brandt views the use of the class action device as a natural 
reaction to the public-health challenges of individual lawsuits that had 
generally failed for decades.  Brandt identifies three factors in particular: 
(1) the problems encountered by plaintiffs in proving causation by using 
statistical risk science, i.e. epidemiology; (2) the perception of the public, 
fueled by the tobacco industry, that smokers bear responsibility for their 
own smoking; and (3) the fact that “jurors saw an important inequity in 
enriching a few individual smokers or their survivors” at the expense of the 
other injured smokers who opted not to sue.129  The class action device had 
the advantage of showing broad patterns of disease that were relevant to a 
large class of persons—whether the claimants were smokers or 
nonsmokers—as well as allowing the plaintiffs to more efficiently use their 
limited resources to fight the apparently bottomless financial resources of 
the industry.130 
Although Brandt does not discuss the class actions in detail, the 
impression he leaves is optimism for the use of aggregative litigation, such 
as class actions, to bring about some measure of control, if not regulation, 
of the tobacco industry.  He states: “The courts were . . . a critical venue 
not only for injured smokers but for anyone hoping to advance public 
health policies regarding smoking.”131  This optimism is not necessarily 
warranted.  But in the 1990s there was much more reason to be optimistic, 
                                                                                                                          
126 BRANDT, supra note 3, at 438. 
127 See Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc, 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006) (ruling in a class action suit 
brought by United States citizens who have suffered from addiction to cigarettes). 
128 Broin v. Philip Morris Co., Inc., 641 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (case settled during 
trial). 
129 BRANDT, supra note 3, at 404–05. 
130 Id. at 405. 
131 Id. at 439. 
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with the MSA and several high-profile class actions applying pressure to 
the industry simultaneously.  The resulting disappointment of the MSA—
that the tobacco industry remains in control, with the states dependent on 
the agreement’s revenue stream—is one reason for deflation of that 
optimism.  Another reason is a trend in judicial rejection of ambitious class 
actions that seek to advance a public health regulatory agenda, as discussed 
below.132 
E.  Globalization 
The last section of The Cigarette Century focuses on the globalization 
of the tobacco industry, what Brandt refers to as “exporting an 
epidemic.”133  Beginning in 1975, cigarette use in the United States finally 
began to decline, prompting the industry to focus in earnest on other 
countries134 where regulation was scarce.135  Brandt argues that it is just a 
matter of time before the epidemic of smoking-related illness in the United 
States manifests itself as a global pandemic.  This coming pandemic will 
disproportionately impact developing nations.136 
Brandt spends some time detailing the course of cigarette consumption 
abroad, which mirrors, to a large extent, the social history of the cigarette 
in the United States.  Factors such as introducing the cigarette to women 
and mining the youth market have contributed to the product’s growth 
abroad.137  He further describes the conflict between non-domestic tobacco 
companies and state-run cigarette monopolies in some countries.  Brandt’s  
basic argument is that free trade has led to an increase in smoking-related 
illness worldwide, and that this result has been facilitated by a combination 
of several factors: the tobacco industry protecting its interests; international 
organizations (such as the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank) ignoring the impact free trade would have on world health; United 
States trade policy protecting the tobacco industry; and the inability of 
procedures pursuant to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) to sufficiently assess the public health impact of the trade 
practices that came within its jurisdiction.138  The result has been that 
tobacco products are treated like any other product for trade purposes, a 
situation that has created tension between economic interests and public 
                                                                                                                          
132 See infra Part IV. 
133 BRANDT, supra note 3, at 449. 
134 Id. at 450. 
135 Id. at 452 (“[T]he tobacco industry maintains strong corporate ties to national governments 
that typically have little or no history of product regulation.”). 
136 Id. at 451. 
137 Id. at 457. 
138 See id. at 460–67 (discussing how a number of factors associated with globalization and free 
trade led to an increase in smoking-related illnesses worldwide). 
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health interests.139 
Ultimately, Brandt advocates for the development of an international 
treaty for tobacco with a strong public health theme.  The World Health 
Organization (WHO) developed a Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control (FCTC) which is designed to establish minimum standards for a 
country’s control of tobacco products.  The FCTC endorses, among other 
things, package warnings, disclosure that terminology such as “low tar” is 
misleading, a ban on advertising, and restrictions on sales to minors.140  In 
2003, the member nations of WHO, including the United States, adopted 
the FCTC.141  The treaty then went into effect in 2005 and entered a phase 
of negotiations with binding protocols.142  While 140 nations had ratified 
the FCTC at the time Brandt’s book was published, the United States had 
not143 and has yet to do so.144 
Brandt’s discussion of the globalization of tobacco and the efforts at 
international tobacco control has three basic themes.  The first is that, for 
political and economic reasons, regulating tobacco on an international 
basis is just as difficult, and likely more so, than regulating it in American 
society.  The second theme returns to the pervasive public health argument 
throughout the book.  Brandt says that the international public health 
community must abandon the notion that contagious diseases should be 
managed before chronic non-contagious diseases, such as smoking-related 
illness.  He argues that because the health benefits of tobacco regulation 
will not be visible for years into the future, political officials are less 
interested in focusing on a problem that cannot be measured in immediate 
benefits.145  Brandt says that the public health effects of tobacco constitute 
a global pandemic worthy of action to the same degree as any 
communicable disease.146  Third, Brandt argues for an international 
concept of public health in which all persons have a “right to a life free of 
preventable and treatable disease.”147  He quotes Gro Harlem Brundtland, 
the former director-general of WHO: “There is . . . an increasing consensus 
for ethical norms, standards, and codes of rules common to all regions and 
cultures of the world.”148 
The epilogue to the book is clearly an add-on.  It is, in part, a 
preemptive strike on anyone who would question Brandt’s objectivity and 
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140 Id. at 478–79. 
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143 Id. at 486. 
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neutrality in relation to the matters on which he reports.  He discusses how 
he came to agree to serve as an expert witness for the Department of 
Justice in the federal government’s case against the tobacco industry and 
details his experience—ultimately disappointing—in the judicial system.149  
This concluding section is perhaps unnecessary and somewhat 
disconcerting; few attorneys would feel that serving as an expert witness in 
major litigation would create a conflict of interest in writing a historical 
tale.  History is, after all, the product of the historians’ perspectives.  But 
Brandt is a professional historian, with different sensibilities from an 
attorney.  While he acknowledges his internal conflict between being a 
witness and a historian, he reconciles the conflict by stating that sometimes 
the historian must become an advocate.150  Indeed, that summarizes his 
dual role as the author of The Cigarette Century. 
III.  PERSPECTIVES ON CHRONIC ILLNESS AND TOXIC TORTS 
A.  Scientific Investigation and Chronic Illness at Mid-Century 
As previously discussed, the unique value of The Cigarette Century 
lies principally in its exposition of the public health history of cigarettes.  
Brandt ably demonstrates the industry’s resiliency in the face of increasing 
scientific evidence of the health hazards of cigarettes.  The uniqueness of 
Brandt’s approach lies in his detailed demonstration of the ways in which 
the industry was able to take advantage of the developing investigatory 
technique of epidemiology151 in the context of chronic illnesses—such as 
lung cancer and emphysema—and use it to negate or question the scientific 
conclusions that emerged.  Even more remarkably, the industry used, 
apparently quite successfully, this manufactured controversy affirmatively 
in its advertising campaigns for decades. 
To understand the impact the new epidemiology has had on toxic tort 
                                                                                                                          
149 Id. at 498–503. 
150 Id. at 505. 
151 Epidemiology may be defined as “[t]he study of the distribution and determinants of health-
related states in human and other animal populations.  Epidemiological studies involve surveillance, 
observation, hypothesis-testing, and experiment.”  STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 582 (Marjory 
Spraycar et al. eds., 26th ed. 1995).  The task of epidemiology is to examine the relationship between a 
disease and a particular factor (such as cigarette smoking) to determine if a causal connection exists.  
Bert Black & David E. Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 
732, 750 (1984).   
The epidemiologist examines this relationship in the context of populations, 
comparing the disease experiences of people exposed to the factor with those not so 
exposed.  Although the epidemiologist utilizes statistical methods, the ultimate goal 
is to draw a biological inference concerning the relationship of the factor to the 
disease’s etiology and/or to its natural history. . . . It is an integrative, eclectic 
science utilizing concepts and methods from other disciplines, such as statistics, 
sociology and demography for the study of disease in populations. 
Id. at 750–51. 
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litigation, it is useful to follow Brandt’s trail of scientific frustration and 
discovery.  Brandt begins his analysis early in the twentieth century, with 
the public health community’s emerging concern about the possible 
relationship between smoking and illness.152  Some of the earliest studies 
sought to determine the chemical composition of cigarette smoke and 
concluded that smokers were exposed to a variety of substances that were 
deemed “poisonous.”153  But the earliest studies that inquired whether a 
relationship existed between smoking and illness suffered from the biases 
of investigators who based the studies on their pre-existing assumption that 
smoking was a health hazard.154  The public health community had not yet 
developed a reliable tool to measure statistically the risk of smoking, in 
part because of the difficulty in designing studies that took into account the 
variable nature of individual exposures, circumstances, and health status.  
Accordingly, “[t]hrough the first half of the twentieth century, it proved 
impossible to categorically substantiate the claims of the harmfulness of 
smoking.”155 
The studies generated in the 1940s were designed to eliminate the kind 
of bias that had beset the earlier attempts.156  These studies consisted of, on 
the one hand, direct medical studies of smokers—such as measuring blood 
pressure and heart function—and, on the other hand, animal laboratory 
studies.157  The direct medical studies on humans, at best, could only 
demonstrate that smoking may aggravate certain cardiovascular conditions, 
but they were unable to establish a causal link to smoking.158  The studies 
on rats exposed to nicotine demonstrated a negative impact on growth and 
development, and on fetal development.159  At least one study on rabbits 
demonstrated a connection between exposure to substances in tobacco tars 
and tumors.160  While useful, none of these studies was able to provide the 
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direct causal connection between smoking and disease in humans that the 
public health community sought. 
Although epidemiologists had been employing randomized, double-
blind clinical trials to investigate the causes of illness, this type of study 
was ill-suited to investigate connections between tobacco and disease.161  
With regard to the effects of smoking, these traditional studies posed 
several problems.  For one thing, the potential long latency period between 
exposure and manifestation of illness was a deterrent.  Additionally, 
exposing study subjects to a substance with potentially harmful effects—
and no therapeutic value—did not comport with appropriate ethical 
conduct.162 
In 1948, researchers Richard Doll and A. Bradford Hill developed the 
retrospective observational study to avoid the disadvantages of the 
randomized, double-blind trial.163  The retrospective study began with a 
group of ill subjects (in this case, lung cancer patients) and compared them 
with healthy subjects.  The data collected from both groups were 
statistically compared to determine the existence and identity of risk 
factors associated with development of the disease.164  The results of the 
study demonstrated a strong correlation between cigarette smoking and 
lung cancer, as well as a dose-response relationship showing more cases of 
lung cancer among those who smoked more.165  The Doll and Hill study, 
and resulting report, form the cornerstone for Brandt’s demonstration of a 
significant evolution in epidemiology at mid-century.  Brandt summarizes 
the value of their methodology as follows: 
Doll and Hill worked to eliminate the possibility of bias in 
the selection of patients and controls, as well as in reporting 
and recording their histories; they emphasized the 
significance of a clear temporal relationship between 
exposure and the subsequent development of disease; and 
                                                                                                                          
Tobacco as a Carcinogenic Agent, 63 DEUTSCHE MED. WOCHENSCHRIFT 1267–71 (1937)).   
161 Such studies are best suited to, for example, clinical drug trials, where a therapeutic value of 
the exposure is anticipated.  See Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 151, at 755–56.  
162 See BRANDT, supra note 3, at 136. 
163 Id. 
164 An important feature in the design of such studies was the neutrality of the researchers.  
According to Brandt, Doll and Hill appeared to have a sufficiently neutral attitude going into the study, 
as they entered the study with “considerable skepticism” about a causal connection between smoking 
and lung cancer.  Id. at 137. 
165 Id. at 138 (citing Raymond Pearl, Tobacco Smoking and Longevity, 87 SCI. 216–17 (1938); 
Richard Doll & Austin Bradford Hill, Smoking and Carcinoma of the Lung: Preliminary Report, 224 
BRIT. MED. J., Sept. 30, 1950, at 742–43, 747).  The study also examined gender distinctions in rates of 
lung cancer among smokers.  The researchers concluded that the fewer cases among women appeared 
to be due to the fact that smoking among women had become commonplace much later than among 
men.  Id. (citing Richard Doll & Austin Bradford Hill, Smoking and Carcinoma of the Lung: 
Preliminary Report, 224 BRIT. MED. J., Sept. 30, 1950, at 742–43, 747).  This early study demonstrates 
the importance of the latency period in identifying the causal connection between a particular exposure 
and the appearance of disease. 
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they sought to rule out any other factors that might 
distinguish controls from patients with disease.  This explicit 
search for, and elimination of, possible “confounders” was a 
critical step toward their conclusion.  Further, they insisted 
on carefully addressing all possible alternative explanations 
for their findings.166 
The problem with their approach, however, was that they could not state 
definitively that cigarette smoking caused a particular subject’s lung 
cancer.  They could only provide a statistical probability, or risk factor, 
relating to smoking and lung cancer. 
Shortly after the publication of their retrospective study,167 Doll and 
Hill designed a prospective study that looked at a large group of healthy 
physicians whose health and smoking habits they followed for several 
years.168  The prospective study, in which no participants were ill with lung 
cancer when the study began, eliminated any bias that might have existed 
in the earlier study where hospital patients with lung cancer were 
specifically studied.  The results confirmed the conclusions they had 
reached in the retrospective study.169  Moreover, the new epidemiological 
studies were consistent with the earlier clinical studies and animal studies.  
An impressive body of scientific data was accumulating that tended to 
show a causal connection between cigarette smoking and lung cancer, as 
well as cardiovascular disease.170 
B.  The Science of Toxic Tort Litigation in Historical Context 
Brandt’s analysis is consistent with the dilemma of specific causation 
in the law of toxic torts.  The specific causation problem in toxic torts has 
been addressed by many courts, perhaps most pedagogically by the court in 
Allen v. United States, a case involving injuries from radiation exposure 
during the United States government’s atomic weapons testing program in 
the 1950s.171  The plaintiffs suffered from leukemia and other cancers that 
they claimed had been induced by exposure to environmental radiation 
from the testing program.  Several factors complicated their ability to 
prove causation, including long latency periods between the time of 
exposure and the manifestation of their illnesses, the possibility that other 
intervening causes were responsible for the illnesses, and the fact that the 
                                                                                                                          
166 Id. at 140. 
167 Doll and Hill came under attack for possible bias in their study design.  Id. at 142. 
168 Id. at 144. 
169 Id. (citing Richard Doll & A. Bradford Hill, Lung Cancer and Other Causes of Death in 
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illnesses claimed were “non-specific” because radiation-induced cancers 
were indistinguishable from cancers resulting from other causes or arising 
idiopathically.172 
The Allen court succinctly summarized the plaintiffs’ causation 
dilemma: 
In most cases, the factual connection between 
defendant’s conduct and plaintiff’s injury is not genuinely in 
dispute.  Often, the cause-and-effect relationship is obvious: 
A’s vehicle strikes B, injuring him; a bottle of A’s product 
explodes, injuring B; water impounded on A’s property flows 
onto B’s land, causing immediate damage. 
In this case, the factual connection singling out the 
defendant as the source of the plaintiffs’ injuries and deaths is 
very much in genuine dispute.  Determination of the cause-
in-fact, or factual connection, issue is complicated by the 
nature of the injuries suffered . . . , the nature of the causation 
mechanism . . . , the extraordinary time factors and other 
variables . . . .173 
As the court suggested, in traditional torts, cause in fact is often a relatively 
straightforward analysis, a question of drawing an uninterrupted linear 
connection between the defendant’s conduct (exploding product, motor 
vehicle collision) and the plaintiff’s injury.  While challenges always exist 
when multiple actors174 or pre-existing conditions175 are involved, 
generally a single analysis of cause in fact will suffice.  In contrast, cases 
involving latent illness, such as toxic torts, typically necessitate a 
bifurcation of the cause in fact analysis between determination of general 
causation—the ability of the substance to cause the kind of illness suffered 
by the plaintiff—and specific causation—proof that the substance actually 
caused the occurrence of the illness in the plaintiff.176 
Further complicating this inquiry is the fact that medical science has 
yet to identify a single mechanism that can definitively be said to cause 
                                                                                                                          
172 Id. at 406; see also Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 151, at 738 (“Because most toxic tort cases 
involve diseases with long latency or incubation periods, and because many of these diseases may 
occur in the absence of any identifiable exposure, causation very often becomes a central and complex 
issue at trial.”). 
173 Allen, 588 F. Supp. at 405. 
174 See, e.g., Landers v. E. Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co., 248 S.W.2d 731, 734 (Tex. 1952) 
(finding both polluting defendants liable for property damage where each was a substantial factor in 
damage). 
175 See, e.g., Dillon v. Twin State Gas & Elec. Co., 163 A. 111, 115 (N.H. 1932) (holding 
defendant liable only for hastening decedent’s death which was certain to occur from other causes). 
176 See Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1200 (6th Cir. 1988) (requiring plaintiffs 
to prove both that the allegedly injurious substances could cause the claimed illnesses and that the 
substances actually caused the plaintiffs’ specific illnesses). 
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cancer.  As a result, in the words of one expert, “any statement about the 
role of any agent as a carcinogen is hedged with assumptions and 
hypotheses.  Because scientists do not yet understand the molecular model 
of carcinogenesis, it is impossible to state that a given carcinogen caused 
any individual tumor.”177  Even where a particular substance is known to 
be carcinogenic, thus establishing general causation, a plaintiff may have 
difficulty demonstrating that the exposure to the substance actually caused 
his or her individual cancer.178  If cause in fact cannot be established, a 
plaintiff will not be able to sustain his or her case for damages, unless a 
court is willing to ease the causation requirements.179 
Brandt details this medical dilemma which led to the causation 
problems that have shaped so much of toxic tort litigation.  Brandt admits 
that a probabilistic conclusion such as that achieved in the Doll and Hill 
study was a major shift in scientific inquiry, and argues that these new 
studies were useful for determining the causes of the new kinds of chronic 
illnesses emerging in the twentieth century.  He states: “For those in search 
                                                                                                                          
177 Troyen A. Brennan, Causal Chains and Statistical Links: The Role of Scientific Uncertainty in 
Hazardous-Substance Litigation, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 469, 475 (1988). 
178 See Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Toxic Torts, Causation, and Scientific Evidence After Daubert, 55 
U. PITT. L. REV. 889, 899 (1994) (noting that a statistical study alone is not enough to prove that a 
carcinogenic substance caused a particular individual’s case of cancer).  In Sterling v. Velsicol 
Chemical Corp., the court stated: 
It was first established that Velsicol was responsible for the contamination and that 
the particular contaminants were capable of producing injuries of the types allegedly 
suffered by the plaintiffs. . . . This enabled the court to determine a kind of generic 
causation—whether the combination of the chemical contaminants and the 
plaintiffs’ exposure to them had the capacity to cause the harm alleged.  This still 
left the matter of individual cause to be determined. . . . [G]eneralized proofs will 
not suffice to prove individual damages. 
Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1200. 
179 In Allen v. United States, for example, the court accommodated the plaintiffs by allowing them 
to state a case, absent traditional proof of cause in fact, based upon the following test: 
Where a defendant who negligently creates a radiological hazard which puts an 
identifiable population group at increased risk, and a member of that group at risk 
develops a biological condition which is consistent with having been caused by the 
hazard to which he has been negligently subjected, such consistency having been 
demonstrated by substantial, appropriate, persuasive and connecting factors, a fact 
finder may reasonably conclude that the hazard caused the condition absent 
persuasive proof to the contrary offered by the defendant. 
Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 415 (D. Utah 1984).  The “connecting factors” 
included: 
(1) [T]he probability that plaintiff was exposed to ionizing radiation due to nuclear 
fallout from atmospheric testing at the Nevada Test Site at rates in excess of natural 
background radiation; (2) that plaintiff’s injury is of a type consistent with those 
known to be caused by exposure to radiation; and (3) that plaintiff resided in 
geographical proximity to the Nevada Test Site for some time between 1951 and 
1962.  Other factual connections may include but are not limited to such things as 
time and extent of exposure to fallout, radiation sensitivity factors such as age or 
special sensitivities of the afflicted organ or tissue, retroactive internal or external 
dose estimation by current researchers, a latency period consistent with a radiation 
etiology, or an observed statistical incidence of the alleged injury greater than the 
expected incidence in the same population. 
Id. 
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of a ‘definitive’ demonstrative experiment, notions of probabilistic, 
quantitative findings were anathema.  Many researchers now pointed out, 
however, that much in medicine and science could not necessarily be 
confirmed in the laboratory.”180 
In toxic tort litigation, the utility of retrospective and prospective 
studies such as those conducted by Doll and Hill is immeasurable.  More 
than half a century later, however, these studies still carry a legal stigma 
associated with their inability to provide a conclusive causal connection 
between exposure and disease.  Simply put, epidemiological studies are 
predictive of the probability that a particular person’s illness may have 
resulted from exposure to the particular toxic substance, but do not 
establish that the illness actually resulted from the exposure.181  In toxic 
tort litigation, epidemiological studies have become the most important 
evidence of causation.  Thus, in Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., a product liability case involving the drug Bendectin, the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals stated that “[u]ndoubtedly, the most useful and 
conclusive type of evidence in a case such as this is epidemiological 
studies.”182  But plaintiffs have encountered difficult admissibility 
problems when using epidemiological evidence because of its probabilistic 
nature.183 
Brandt acknowledges that at the time the new epidemiology was 
emerging, its greatest critics were some of the researchers’ scientific 
colleagues who clung to traditional investigative methods.  Brandt states: 
“Epidemiological findings like those of Doll and Hill would come under 
attack from scientists unilaterally committed to experimental laboratory 
investigation.  But the lab offered no way of resolving the question of 
smoking’s harms.”184  Brandt argues that the history of scientific inquiry 
into biomedical matters has rejected a single, monolithic investigational 
method of the sort these critics favored.185  He further contends that the 
tobacco industry was particularly instrumental in keeping alive the notion 
of a single-cause modality and in creating a fictional “battle between 
laboratory and statistical science” to further its own interests in 
maintaining the idea that smoking was safe.186 
                                                                                                                          
180 BRANDT, supra note 3, at 150. 
181 Eggen, supra note 178, at 899. 
182 Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 311 (5th Cir. 1989), modified, 884 F.2d 
166 (5th Cir. 1989). 
183 Id.; Eggen, supra note 178, at 909–31 (discussing admissibility issues under the Federal Rules 
of Evidence). 
184 BRANDT, supra note 3, at 151. 
185 “[T]here has never been, as some would later claim, a single gold standard of disease causality.  
That the biomedical paradigm of single cause and single disease was a chimera was well understood by 
even its most vigorous advocates.  And medical knowledge was always provisional and contingent.”  
Id. at 152. 
186 Id. at 153. 
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The vestiges of this attitude appear in contemporary toxic tort litigation 
and continue to present problems for plaintiffs.  General Electric Co. v. 
Joiner is a case in point.187  Best known as the second in the trio of rulings 
by the United States Supreme Court on the admissibility of scientific 
evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence,188 Joiner was a toxic tort 
suit brought by a worker with lung cancer who claimed workplace 
exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), but who also had a history 
of smoking and a family history of lung cancer.189  The district court held 
that the epidemiological and animal studies proffered by the plaintiff to 
prove causation were inadmissible.190  While the Eleventh Circuit 
reversed,191 the Supreme Court held that an admissibility decision was 
reviewable only for abuse of discretion and that ample evidence existed in 
the record to support the decision of the district court.192  The Court was 
particularly concerned that the proffered studies did not prove the specific 
causation the plaintiff was required to show.  The Court stated: 
Trained experts commonly extrapolate from existing data.  
But nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of 
Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence 
that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the 
expert.  A court may conclude that there is simply too great 
an analytical gap between the data and the opinion 
proffered.193 
The Court thus rejected the notion that a study, such as an epidemiological 
study, that may demonstrate some measure of general causation could be 
made to demonstrate specific causation simply because that was the 
position of the plaintiff’s qualified expert. 
The Joiner decision raises the legal question connected to the 
epidemiological revolution detailed by Brandt in The Cigarette Century: 
Can the analytical gap between epidemiological evidence and proof of 
specific causation ever be narrowed?  This is one of the most pervasive 
problems in all of toxic torts.  Indeed, some courts have attempted to apply 
a statistical standard to the admissibility of epidemiological studies in an 
                                                                                                                          
187 General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
188 The best known of the cases is Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595–96 
(1993) (discussing the various factors that should be considered in determining reliability of evidence, 
and holding that the Federal Rules of Evidence require that scientific evidence must be both 
scientifically reliable and relevant).  See also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999) 
(holding that the Daubert admissibility test applies not just to scientific studies, but to any expert 
scientific, technical, or other evidence sought to be admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 702). 
189 Joiner, 522 U.S. at 139–40. 
190 Joiner v. General Electric Co., 864 F. Supp. 1310, 1326 (N.D. Ga. 1994), rev’d, 78 F.3d 524, 
534 (11th Cir. 1996), rev’d, 522 U.S. 136, 147 (1997). 
191 Joiner v. General Electric Co., 78 F.3d 524, 534 (11th Cir. 1996), rev’d, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
192 Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146–47. 
193 Id. at 146. 
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effort to impose some sort of objective threshold on the admissibility 
process.  For example, in Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., a silicone gel 
breast implant case, the federal district court held that only evidence based 
upon studies on the relationship between implants and various autoimmune 
diseases that had a statistical relative risk factor greater than 2.0 would be 
admissible.194  But such efforts remain problematic, largely because 
disagreement exists over the significance of statistical relative risk and the 
arbitrariness of choosing a particular threshold for admissibility.195 
Scientific inquiry is an evolving process, and “arguably there are no 
certainties in science.”196  The enterprise of the law, particularly the 
judicial system, requires resolution and closure at a definite point in time.  
Thus, science and the law may sometimes appear incompatible.  In toxic 
tort litigation, however, the judicial system must find a point of consensus.  
Courts would do well to heed the lessons of the public health community 
in fashioning forward-looking rules to accommodate plaintiffs’ causation 
difficulties in such cases. 
IV.  PREEMPTION AND THE INTERACTION OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW 
Brandt’s discussion of the attempts at regulating the tobacco industry 
resonates throughout other areas of toxic tort law as well.  His observations 
on regulatory efforts in the area of tobacco products illuminate the current 
legal dilemma in federal preemption as it applies to product liability 
generally and toxic products in particular.  Preemption is a major 
battlefield in toxic torts, playing out in litigation related to cigarettes,197 
medical devices,198 prescription drugs,199 and pesticides.200  The current 
state, and future shape and scope, of toxic product litigation was, in large 
part, determined by regulatory events related to tobacco products in the 
middle of the twentieth century. 
As Brandt demonstrates, the enactment of the Federal Cigarette 
Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965201 marked the first time the tobacco 
                                                                                                                          
194 Hall v. Baxter Healthcare, 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1403–05 (D. Or. 1996). 
195 For a discussion of risk factors in epidemiological studies, see Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 
151, at 757–58; Junius C. McElveen & Pamela S. Eddy, Cancer and Toxic Substances: The Problem of 
Causation and the Use of Epidemiology, 33 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 29, 39 (1985); see also Lucinda M. 
Finley, Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges Are Using Their Evidentiary 
Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 352–60 (1999) (discussing 
breast implant litigation and arguing that trial courts have conflated the standard of evidentiary 
admissibility and legal sufficiency of claims). 
196 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993). 
197 See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 530–31 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
198 See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 474, 486–89 (1996). 
199 See, e.g., Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 182 (Vt. 2006), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1118 
(2008). 
200 See, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 447–48, 452 (2005). 
201 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 
(codified and amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1340 (2000)). 
 2008] LESSONS FROM A CENTURY OF CIGARETTES 595 
industry took a concerted stand on regulation with tort litigation in mind.  
While the specter of tort litigation had been a threat to the industry from 
the earliest emergence of studies connecting smoking and cancer, 
following the Surgeon General’s report in the 1960s tort litigation emerged 
in the foreground.  Brandt discusses the contingent nature of the industry’s 
accession to regulation: The industry was only interested in regulation to 
the extent that it would operate to preempt state tort actions based upon 
smoking and health, thereby immunizing the industry from tort 
liabilities.202  The point Brandt makes, however, is that throughout this 
period of minimal labeling and advertising regulation in the 1960s and 
1970s, the tobacco industry continued to thrive, with cigarette sales 
flourishing and profits rising.203  Thus, the appearance of package warnings 
seemed to have failed to produce the desired governmental purpose.204 
The efforts of the tobacco industry to achieve preemption of state 
common-law tort actions against them based upon smoking and health did 
not meet with complete success.  As Brandt discusses, an important feature 
of the legal landscape in the 1960s was the appearance of strict product 
liability, made manifest in Section 402A of 1965’s Restatement (Second) 
of Torts, which eschewed negligence in favor of requiring the plaintiff to 
show that the product was “in a defective condition unreasonably 
dangerous to the ultimate user or consumer.”205  Under the emerging strict 
product liability regime,206 the tobacco industry worked to establish a 
position that would best shield it from what it feared would be a flood of 
tort claims by smokers. 
The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the 
federal cigarette labeling acts preempted tort claims against the tobacco 
companies in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., a product liability action 
brought on behalf of a deceased smoker.207  The Supreme Court’s decision 
                                                                                                                          
202 BRANDT, supra note 3, at 254. 
203 See id. at 256–57. 
204 See id. at 257. 
205 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965). 
206 Product manufacturers logically perceived the requirements of strict liability as releasing 
plaintiffs from the more difficult showings of duty and breach of duty that negligence claims require. 
The Second Restatement of Torts was also important in making explicit the abrogation of privity of 
contract in the product liability context, which made it easier for injured persons to sue under strict 
product liability.  See id. § 402A(1)(b) (1965) (providing that a seller of a defective product is liable for 
a plaintiff’s physical injury if the seller could expect the product to reach the user). 
207 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 512 (1992) (plurality opinion).  Brandt spends 
substantial time discussing the trial of the Cipollone case, which occurred much earlier, following a 
ruling by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 186–87 
(3d Cir. 1986), that effectively preempted many of the plaintiff’s claims.  See BRANDT, supra note 3, at 
329–35.  The jury found that Liggett had breached its duty to warn of the health hazards of its 
cigarettes prior to the 1966 package warnings, but that Rose Cipollone was eighty percent responsible 
for her own injuries, which barred any recovery on the negligence claims.  Cipollone, 893 F.2d at 554.  
The jury awarded $400,000 to her husband, however, for his damages on the claim for breach of 
express warranty, but awarded no damages to Rose Cipollone’s estate on the warranty claim.  Id. at 
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on the preemption issue reflected the deep ambivalence in legal circles 
over the treatment of smokers’ health claims.  On the one hand, the 
decision did not provide the tobacco industry with the blanket protection it 
had sought and ensured that the courtroom battles over manufacturer 
liability for smoking-related illness would continue unabated.  On the other 
hand, it shielded the industry from several major claims.  After examining 
the language of the preemption provisions contained in the 1966 and 1969 
cigarette labeling acts, the Court determined that only the 1969 act 
preempted tort claims, and preempted only those asserting that the 
company failed to adequately warn of the health hazards of smoking.208  
The failure-to-warn claims included negligent failure-to-warn, strict 
liability, and claims that the company had neutralized the impact of the 
package warnings through its advertising.209  The Court ruled that the 
claims not preempted were negligent testing and research, 
misrepresentation claims not specifically relating to packaging or 
advertising, and the express warranty claim.210 
The preemption battle has become heated in toxic tort litigation in the 
years since the Cipollone decision.  Indeed, preemption is one of the most 
important legal issues involving allegedly toxic products currently 
confronting the bench and bar.  Cipollone initiated the analytical process 
for determining the relationship between personal-injury tort claims and 
health-based federal legislation.  The Supreme Court has subsequently 
employed that analytical process in a variety of toxic product preemption 
actions involving several statutes. 
Thus, in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, the Court held that the 
express preemption provision in the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)211 did not preempt most of the product liability 
claims raised in the case, including claims for defective product design, 
defective manufacturing, negligent testing, and express warranty.212  In 
Bates, Dow brought a declaratory judgment action against farmers who 
claimed that Dow’s pesticide, Strongarm, damaged their crops.  Dow 
                                                                                                                          
555.  Although this was the first plaintiff’s verdict in a tort action for smoking-related illness, the 
victory proved short-lived.  The Third Circuit remanded the case for a new trial on the basis of 
erroneous jury instructions.  Id. at 569.  Still, the Cipollone verdict was another watershed event, 
signaling the willingness of the public—as represented by the jury—to view the actions of the industry 
negatively. 
208 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524.  The distinction between the Court’s interpretation of the 1966 act 
and the 1969 act vis-à-vis preemption related to the change in language in the preemption provision.  
Id. at 520.  For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s decision and its importance in cigarette litigation 
generally, see Eggen, supra note 81, at 8–18. 
209 See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 509, 524, 528. 
210 Id. at 522, 524–27.  Back in the district court for yet another trial, the former trial judge was 
removed, and the plaintiff’s attorney withdrew.  KLUGER, supra note 6, at 676–77.  Subsequently, the 
family decided not to pursue the case further.  BRANDT, supra note 3, at 352. 
211 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2000). 
212 Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005). 
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sought a determination that the farmers’ product liability claims would be 
preempted by FIFRA.213  In its decision, the Court—in an opinion authored 
by Justice Stevens, the author of the plurality opinion in Cipollone—
directly followed its reasoning in Cipollone even though Bates involved a 
different federal statute and property damage claims rather than personal 
injuries.214 
In 2008, the Court embraced Cipollone yet again in an important 
product preemption decision, Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.215  Riegel picks up 
where the Court left off in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,216 with both cases 
involving the preemption provision in the Medical Device Amendments 
(MDA) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).217  In Lohr, the 
Court had relied heavily on Cipollone in holding that none of the plaintiffs’ 
personal injury product liability claims was preempted.218  But in Riegel, 
the Court seems to have moved even closer to Cipollone’s result, in which 
some claims were deemed to be preempted and others not.219  The Court 
leaned on Cipollone in ruling that the term “requirements” in a preemption 
provision—one stating that no state requirements different from those 
imposed under the relevant federal statute would be allowed—could 
encompass common-law claims.  The Court stated: 
Congress is entitled to know what meaning this Court will 
assign to terms regularly used in its enactments.  Absent 
other indication, reference to a State’s “requirements” 
includes its common-law duties.  As the plurality opinion 
said in Cipollone, common-law liability is “premised on the 
existence of a legal duty,” and a tort judgment therefore 
establishes that the defendant has violated a state-law 
obligation.  And while the common-law remedy is limited to 
damages, a liability award “‘can be, indeed is designed to be, 
a potent method of governing conduct and controlling 
policy.’”220 
Even though Riegel involved a different statute, a textually different 
                                                                                                                          
213 Id. at 434–35.  The farmers counterclaimed with claims based upon strict liability, negligence, 
fraud, breach of warranty, and violation of the Texas Deceptive Practices-Consumer Protection Act.  
Id. at 435–36. 
214 See Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, The Normalization of Product Preemption Doctrine, 57 ALA. L. 
REV. 725, 747, 750–51 (2006) (“[T]he Court clearly was contemplating Cipollone and establishing 
some consistency between that case and Bates.”). 
215 Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008). 
216 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996). 
217 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1999). 
218 See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 494–502 (citing Cipollone, the Court held that the MDA did not pre-
empt the Lohrs’ claims). 
219 To a large extent, this movement is attributable to the composition of the Court in 2008. 
220 Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1008 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521–22 
(1992)) (internal citations omitted). 
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preemption provision, and different underlying purposes and policy goals, 
the Court held that “there is nothing to contradict this normal meaning” of 
the term “requirements” as it had been defined in Cipollone.221  The Court 
went on to hold that claims based upon alleged defects in the defendant’s 
cardiac balloon catheter were expressly preempted by the MDA because 
the extensive premarket approval process that the device underwent 
established specific health and safety requirements for the device that 
potentially contradicted state tort liability.222 
In Riegel, the Supreme Court used Cipollone as the legal standard for 
express preemption, holding that the term “requirements” in a preemption 
provision will be presumed to encompass liabilities under state common 
law.  This extension of Cipollone to other statutes is significant and may 
have far-reaching implications.  So far, however, preemption has not 
extended to all claims related to smoking and health. 
In 2008, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in what 
could prove to be an important test of Cipollone’s strength—and of the 
tobacco industry’s power.  In October 2008, the Court heard arguments in 
Good v. Altria Group, Inc., in which the First Circuit Court of Appeals 
addressed another aspect of cigarette labeling invoking the preemption 
provision of the cigarette labeling act.223  The plaintiffs claimed that 
defendant Philip Morris had used unfair and deceptive practices when it 
sold certain “light” cigarettes or cigarettes advertised as containing 
“lowered tar and nicotine.”224  The plaintiffs alleged that Philip Morris was 
aware that smokers of these cigarettes unconsciously drew in more smoke 
or covered ventilation holes so as to make up for the reduced amounts of 
nicotine they otherwise would inhale; thus, the plaintiffs claimed that 
Philip Morris’s labeling had materially misrepresented the cigarettes as 
being a safer alternative for smokers.225  The First Circuit closely followed 
the Cipollone decision in reversing the district court’s dismissal of the 
claims226 and held that the cigarette labeling act neither expressly227 nor 
impliedly228 preempted the claims.  Furthermore, the court held that the 
claims were not preempted by the Federal Trade Commission’s action on 
light cigarette labeling, which was ambiguous at best and had not 
                                                                                                                          
221 Id. 
222 Id. at 1011. 
223 Good v. Altria Group, Inc., 501 F.3d 29, 30 (1st Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1119 
(2008).   
224 Id. at 30.  
225 Id. at 31. 
226 The district court had characterized the claims as failure-to-warn claims, rather than 
misrepresentation and/or fraud claims.  Accordingly, the district court followed the direct holding of 
Cipollone and ruled that the claims were preempted by the labeling act.  See id. at 33, 37. 
227 Id. at 39. 
228 Id. at 49. 
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amounted to formal rulemaking.229 
Indisputably, Cipollone was a watershed event in preemption 
jurisprudence, but what remains to be seen is the degree to which the case 
has continued longevity.  In Riegel, the Court continued to rely upon 
Cipollone’s interpretation of “requirements” in the 1969 cigarette labeling 
act’s express preemption provision to allow for the preemption of state tort 
actions, and extended the force of Cipollone to other statutes with similar 
language.  But Good will demonstrate whether the Court will take a more 
expansive position on preemption and move beyond Cipollone, either in 
interpreting the scope of the cigarette labeling act’s preemption provision 
or in applying implied preemption, or both.230  If the Court holds for Philip 
Morris, it will move away from the direct holding in Cipollone.  Either 
way, the case has potential for far-reaching implications in other types of 
product liability actions, involving other federal statutes.  Furthermore, the 
tobacco industry is still lobbying for some measure of regulation, this time 
by the FDA.231  The regulation would presumably include a clear 
preemption provision to shield it from liability. 
In the wake of Good, it is possible that product preemption doctrine 
will turn yet another corner with the potential result of restricting or 
eliminating many common product claims.  Indeed, the tobacco industry’s 
strategy has proved to be a template for the approach of other industries 
toward regulation when faced with the prospect of extensive tort liabilities.  
In another important 2008 development, the United States Supreme Court 
has granted certiorari in a pharmaceutical case in which the manufacturer 
of the anti-nausea drug Phenergan has argued that a plaintiff’s state-law 
tort claims are impliedly preempted by the FDCA, an act that does not 
contain a preemption provision applicable to drugs.  In Levine v. Wyeth, 
the Vermont Supreme Court held that implied conflict preemption did not 
bar the plaintiff’s claims.232  This case moves away from the express 
                                                                                                                          
229 See id. at 51–54 (discussing the preference of agencies to formulate policy through case-by-
case adjudication rather than rulemaking). 
230 Oral argument in the Good case was held on October 6, 2008.  For the full transcript of the 
argument, see http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/07-562.pdf.  
During argument, Justice Ginsberg questioned the attorneys on what the MSA said about deceptive 
practices of the industry.  See id. at 18, 36.  Presumably, Justice Ginsberg thought the contents of the 
MSA may have some impact on the preemption question before the court.  Ultimately, Good will 
reveal whether the Court will follow Cipollone directly or take it in a different direction. 
231 See PHILIP MORRIS USA GOV’T. AFF., FDA & TOBACCO: WHERE WE STAND 32 (2008), 
available at http://www.philipmorrisusa.com/en/cms/Responsibility/Government_Relations/Legislative 
_Issues/pdfs/fda_and_tobacco.pdf.aspx (discussing the key legislative provisions of the Family 
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act). 
232 Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 188–89 (Vt. 2006), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1118 (2008) (oral 
argument held on Nov. 3, 2008).  Contra Colacicco v. Apotex Inc., 521 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(holding that preemption bars the plaintiff’s action).  For arguments against preemption of drug product 
liability claims, see David A. Kessler & David C. Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA’s 
Efforts to Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2008), which discusses these 
issues in light of the FDA’s new policy favoring drug claim preemption.  But see Richard A. Epstein, 
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preemption issues addressed in Cipollone and takes the product preemption 
debate to the next level, that of implied preemption, and will possibly 
expand preemption further.  The arguments of the drug manufacturer in 
Levine are the direct descendants of the arguments raised by the tobacco 
industry in Cipollone, and will determine the scope and character of toxic 
product litigation well into the future. 
As 2008 wanes, the outgoing Bush administration has developed a 
strategy to apply preemption expansively to many product claims.  This 
move is directly connected to the events documented by Brandt generally, 
and to the administration’s dissatisfaction with the Cipollone line of cases, 
which has continued to allow many product liability claims.  Reports 
indicate that administration officials have written approximately fifty rules 
to bar product liability claims involving a broad array of products.233  The 
current focus on preemption is testimony to the continued vitality of the 
tort reform movement and to the legacy of the tobacco industry, whose 
initial—and continuing—efforts have made preemption one of the most 
significant legal issues of our time. 
V.  MASS TORT LITIGATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH GOALS 
Another aspect of toxic tort law affected by the events detailed in The 
Cigarette Century is mass toxic tort litigation.  During the 1990s, the anti-
tobacco bar turned its attention to the judicial system with mixed results.  
Brandt declares, “[B]etween 1994 and 1997, more lawsuits were filed 
against tobacco firms than in the previous thirty years.”234  Brandt gives the 
impression that much of the impetus for resorting to the courts was the 
frustrating efforts at regulation of tobacco.  While this is true to some 
extent, the situation was legally far more complex. 
The increase in tobacco product liability lawsuits was a natural 
outgrowth of the toxic tort phenomenon that took hold following the 1984 
settlement of In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation235 and the 
1986 settlement during trial of Anderson v. W.R. Grace,236 given household 
recognition by the publication of Jonathan Harr’s book, A Civil Action.237  
Toxic tort litigation became a recognizable feature of the legal landscape 
                                                                                                                          
Why the FDA Must Preempt Tort Litigation: A Critique of Chevron Deference and a Response to 
Richard Nagareda, 1 J. TORT. L. 1 (2006), available at http://www.bepress.com/jtl/vol1/iss1/art5/ 
(arguing in favor of drug claim preemption). 
233 Alicia Mundy, Bush Rule Changes Could Block Product-Safety Suits, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 
2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122403828537735379.html?mod=dist_smartbrief 
(stating that the rules include “everything from motorcycle brakes to pain medicine”). 
234 BRANDT, supra note 3, at 404. 
235 In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (“Fairness 
Opinion” approving settlement). 
236 Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Mass. 1986).  
237 JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1995). 
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throughout the late 1980s and 1990s.  A natural adjunct of this was an 
increase in smoker suits and nonsmoker ETS suits.  Developments in 
asbestos litigation had driven the legal issues in toxic product liability suits 
since the 1970s, particularly with respect to the application of the doctrine 
of strict product liability, and plaintiffs were achieving success.238  
Asbestos mass litigation reached epidemic proportions in the 1990s, with 
attorneys and courts working to develop means to manage the influx of 
claims.  Accordingly, there was an increased interest in the use of the class 
action device and other aggregative procedures to resolve mass tort 
actions,239 many of which had public health implications. 
Tobacco claims seemed uniquely suited to an aggregative device such 
as the class action.  Although the section on litigation in The Cigarette 
Century is relatively small in relation to other sections of the book, it 
demonstrates that the use of aggregative procedures was instrumental in 
making litigation a formidable challenge for the otherwise impervious 
tobacco industry.  Brandt is correct in suggesting that the governmental 
suits for reimbursement of public expenditures for smoking-related 
illnesses arose primarily from a frustration over the lack of industry 
regulation which resulted in high health costs for the states.240  He proceeds 
to demonstrate the way in which these suits were affirmatively used to 
apply pressure to the industry in an attempt to effect “global” regulation.  
Although the 1997 global settlement ultimately failed—because it was 
contingent upon Congress acting to implement its provisions, something 
Congress declined to do—that agreement highlighted the conflicts within 
the public health community over the advisability of negotiations with the 
tobacco industry.  As Brandt states: 
[T]he proposed Global Settlement Agreement brought to 
light an intense social and political debate about the role of 
litigation in the tobacco wars and in the public health 
generally.  Some advocates saw litigation as incremental, 
inefficient, and inappropriate. . . . Others saw the history of 
congressional legislation as powerfully shaped, if not 
corrupted, by industry interests and largesse, and viewed the 
courts as the critical venue for public health reform.241 
This debate within the tobacco public health community is a reflection of 
the larger debate over the role of mass toxic tort litigation, a discussion that 
                                                                                                                          
238 See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973) (affirming a 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff for asbestos injury). 
239 See Linda S. Mullenix, Beyond Consolidation: Postaggregative Procedure in Asbestos Mass 
Tort Litigation, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475 (1991) (discussing districtwide and nationwide class 
actions). 
240 BRANDT, supra note 3, at 412–13. 
241 Id. at 425. 
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is ongoing and heated.242 
Following Congress’s failure to enact the terms of the 1997 global 
settlement, the states signed onto the newly negotiated MSA with the 
tobacco industry in 1998.  As previously discussed, the provisions of the 
MSA had neither the scope nor the anticipated teeth that the 1997 
agreement envisioned.243  The MSA contained what Brandt refers to as “a 
chain of loopholes” that ultimately passed along the costs of the 
agreement’s provisions to consumers and made the states more dependent 
on tobacco money than they had previously been.244  The money received 
by the states pursuant to the MSA contained no spending restrictions.  
Thus, as Brandt documents, by 2005, only about four percent of the monies 
received by the states had been used for tobacco control.245 
The disappointment of the MSA highlighted some fundamental 
problems with attempting to bring about public health regulation through 
mass litigation.  Other cases raise additional problems.  In Castano v. 
American Tobacco Company,246 a nicotine addiction case, the district court 
had certified a class action pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.247  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decertified the 
class and held that the action could not be maintained as a class action 
because the district court had abused its discretion in, among other things, 
deciding that class questions predominated over individual questions.248  In 
particular, the Fifth Circuit noted that the district court had not considered 
the impact a class comprised of persons from all fifty states—representing 
many different product liability regimes—would have on a trial on the 
merits.249 
While other areas of toxic torts have not gone the route of state 
reimbursement suits, numerous efforts at bringing about comprehensive 
“global” resolution of pervasive toxic tort litigation have met with 
resistance and defeat.  For example, in In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals granted a writ of mandamus on the 
matter of class certification in an action brought on behalf of thousands of 
hemophiliacs who claimed to have received contaminated blood 
                                                                                                                          
242 For a discussion of the policies favoring and disfavoring use of aggregative procedures, with 
particular discussion of asbestos litigation, see Edward F. Sherman, Aggregate Disposition of Related 
Cases: The Policy Issues, 10 REV. LITIG. 231 (1991). 
243 See supra notes 118–24 and accompanying text for discussion of the MSA. 
244 BRANDT, supra note 3, at 432–33. 
245 Id. at 435. 
246 Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 870 F. Supp. 1425 (E.D. La. 1994). 
247 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (requiring that questions of law or fact applicable to the class 
predominate over those applicable only to individuals, and that the class action device be superior to 
other procedural devices available to manage the litigation). 
248 Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996). 
249 See id. at 741–43 (“The district court’s review of state law variances can hardly be considered 
extensive; it conducted a cursory review of state law variations and gave short shrift to the defendant’s 
arguments concerning variations.”). 
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products.250  The court determined, among other things, that aggregation of 
the actions into a class action was prejudicial to the defendant because it 
had the effect of pressuring the company into settling the suit, even though 
the company had won twelve of the first thirteen individual lawsuits that 
had previously gone to trial on the same issue.251 
Brandt does not discuss the disadvantages of using the class action 
device for mass toxic torts or the swing of the judicial pendulum away 
from embracing aggregative procedures.  In toxic torts litigation, that trend 
generally has made relief more difficult to achieve for plaintiffs.  The class 
action device has accumulated more negatives the more frequently it has 
been used in mass tort actions, and particularly in mass product liability 
litigation.  Many members of the plaintiffs’ bar are cautious about seeking 
class certification or advising their clients to join a class action if they 
perceive that their clients may not receive a truly equitable share in a class 
action settlement.252  There is no uniformly fair method for allocating 
settlement payments in a class action, and even methods that use a special 
master to determine fair compensation have their limits.253 
Another reason for rejecting the use of class actions in mass product 
liability litigation has been the fragmentation of questions of law and fact 
among a large plaintiff class whose exposures and injuries arose at 
different times and places and under different circumstances.  In general, 
many questions relating to the defendant’s conduct, the nature of the 
product, and general causation can be decided on a class basis.  Specific 
causation and damages, however, are individual questions.  As the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical 
Corporation, “generalized proofs will not suffice to prove individual 
damages.”254  Accordingly, the plaintiffs would have to separately prove 
their individual damages, using their evidence of specific causation.  In 
certifying the Agent Orange class action, Judge Weinstein of the Eastern 
District of New York held that the determination of whether the herbicide 
was a defective product and whether the manufacturers had acted 
                                                                                                                          
250 In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995). 
251 Id. at 1298. 
252 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 acknowledges that it may not be in the best interests of all 
potential class members to join in a class action.  In determining whether to certify a 23(b)(3) class 
action, the rule asks the court to consider “the class members’ interest in individually controlling the 
prosecution or defense of separate actions.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(A). 
253 See Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659, 659–
88 (1989) (discussing the many factors that must be considered in settling a class action and comparing 
the respective challenges of different mass tort cases). 
254 Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1200 (6th Cir. 1988).  In Mertens v. Abbott 
Labs., the court refused to certify a class action because individual proof of the harmful effects of 
exposure to the drug DES would have to be shown by each class member.  Mertens v. Abbott Labs., 99 
F.R.D. 38. 43 (D.N.H. 1983); see also Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1268 (Fla. 2006) 
(“We conclude that continued class action treatment for Phase III of the trial plan is not feasible 
because individualized issues such as legal causation, comparative fault, and damages predominate.”). 
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negligently were issues capable of class resolution.255  These class issues, 
in the court’s estimation, outweighed the numerous individual issues of 
exposure and injuries.256  As the Fifth Circuit noted in Castano, the 
individual issues are amplified considerably when the choice-of-law 
analysis determines that different states’ tort laws apply to class members 
from different states. 
In 2008, with these same concerns in mind, the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals decertified a “light” cigarette class action alleging that the 
tobacco industry violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO)257 by misrepresenting the health benefits of its 
products.  In McLaughlin v. American Tobacco Company, the court held 
that the putative class action “suffers from an insurmountable deficit of 
collective legal or factual questions.”258  Although the plaintiffs argued that 
the course of conduct alleged to violate RICO was conducted class-wide 
by the tobacco industry, the court determined that each plaintiff had to 
provide evidence on the issues of reliance, economic injury, and 
damages.259 
Such decisions raise the critical question: Should the class action 
device be used at all in mass toxic tort litigation?  The 1966 Advisory 
Committee Notes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 stated: “A ‘mass 
accident’ resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not 
appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood that significant 
questions, not only of damages, but of liability and defenses to liability, 
would be present, affecting the individuals in different ways.”260  While the 
Committee was thinking only of single-accident situations, their words 
apply equally, if not more forcefully, to the kind of mass product liability 
actions of which the tobacco personal injury litigation is one example.  
Still, the class action device can be useful in much mass toxic tort litigation 
because the efficiencies can far outweigh the burdens. 
Another anti-class action sentiment expressed by courts has been the 
notion that class actions place undue pressure on defendants to settle.261  
The Fifth Circuit emphasized this point in the Castano nicotine addiction 
litigation: 
In the context of mass tort class actions, certification 
                                                                                                                          
255 In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 722–23 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). 
256 Id. at 722–24. 
257 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2000). 
258 McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 06-4666, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 7093, at *1, *3 (2nd 
Cir. Apr. 3, 2008). 
259 Id. at *14–*15. 
260 FED. R. CIV. P. 23 1966 advisory committee’s note. 
261 See supra notes 250–51 and accompanying text for an illustration of this pressure in the 
context of a class action brought by several thousand hemophiliacs who received contaminated blood 
products. 
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dramatically affects the stakes for defendants.  Class 
certification magnifies and strengthens the number of 
unmeritorious claims.  Aggregation of claims also makes it 
more likely that a defendant will be found liable and results 
in significantly higher damage awards.   
In addition to skewing trial outcomes, class certification 
creates insurmountable pressure on defendants to settle, 
whereas individual trials would not.  The risk of facing an 
all-or-nothing verdict presents too high a risk, even when 
the probability of an adverse judgment is low. These 
settlements have been referred to as judicial blackmail.262 
The negative effect of this may be outweighed by the fact that per capita 
awards in class action settlements are typically far less than payments 
made pursuant to settlement agreements in individual actions.263  
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has expressed 
dissatisfaction with attempts to create the equivalent of a legislative 
solution to mass torts through the mechanism of the courts.  In Amchem 
Products, Inc. v. Windsor, the action was filed as a “settlement class 
action,” along with a settlement agreement that had been previously 
negotiated between representatives of the defendant asbestos 
manufacturers and their insurers and representatives of some of the 
plaintiff class members.264  The parties sought class certification and 
approval of the settlement.  The proposed settlement included a court-
supervised compensation scheme, which would have required class 
members to apply for monetary awards, and set forth parameters for the 
awards, including a ban on punitive damages and caps on compensatory 
damages.  In rejecting class certification, the Court observed: “The 
argument is sensibly made that a nationwide administrative claims 
processing regime would provide the most secure, fair, and efficient means 
                                                                                                                          
262 Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (citations omitted).  The other side of this 
argument is that the imbalance of resources between an individual and a large industry, such as the 
tobacco industry, is corrected by a class action, which gives the individuals leverage against an industry 
that would otherwise have a substantial advantage in resources and experience.  See JACK B. 
WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION 41 (1995). 
263 A useful example is the Agent Orange litigation, in which the settlement approved by the court 
provided for individual cash payments to class members for death and long-term total disability only, 
with only class assistance available to others.  In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 
1396, 1410 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).  That meant that each eligible class member would receive $12,000.  John 
C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the 
Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 923 n.116 (1987) (generally analyzing the market 
efficiency rationales of class actions).  In contrast, an individual class member with a total disability 
would not be limited to this small amount of damages in an individual lawsuit.  Furthermore, injured 
persons without total disability, if successful in their individual actions, would have had appropriate 
money damages available. 
264 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 601–02 (1997).   
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of compensating victims of asbestos exposure.  Congress, however, has not 
adopted such a solution.”265 
Federal court hostility toward mass tort class actions has made the state 
courts attractive to some litigants who perceive them as being more 
receptive to the class action device.  Thus, in In re West Virginia Rezulin 
Litigation, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that the trial 
court should have certified a class action for drug product liability 
claims.266  The class sought an order for medical monitoring, and the court 
determined that common questions concerning the need for monitoring 
predominated over individualized issues.267  Although the West Virginia 
class action rule was identical to the federal rule, the court refused to 
automatically follow related federal court decisions on mass tort class 
actions.268 
Congress has become involved in the debate over the use of the class 
action device, enacting the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA).269 
CAFA has had the effect of moving certain mass actions involving more 
than one hundred persons into federal court, where the strictures of the 
federal rules and Amchem would apply.  CAFA demonstrates the power of 
the business lobby,270 including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,271 which 
pressed Congress to enact the legislation in response to widely publicized 
reports from the American Tort Reform Foundation arguing that class 
action abuses abound.272 
The above developments, including the enactment of CAFA, 
demonstrate the suspicion and even disdain with which the class action 
device is viewed in some circles.  To some degree, this was a result of 
tobacco litigation; but the broader picture suggests that it was due to a 
much larger array of mass tort litigation problems, most of which involved 
alleged toxic substances.  Brandt argues in favor of using aggregative 
litigation to advance societal goals precisely because tobacco regulation 
was not a political priority.  Thus, in his opinion, the courts should be 
                                                                                                                          
265 Id. at 628–29; cf. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 864–65 (1999) (holding improper 
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viewed as a workable alternative to achieve public health goals.  Brandt 
further argues that the judicial system is an important front on which public 
health initiatives can be addressed: “Tobacco litigation—even when 
plaintiffs lost—had a major impact on the larger social and political 
debates about cigarette smoking, the industry, and responsibility for 
harm.”273  The Cigarette Century demonstrates that the public health 
achievements in relation to smoking were a combined effort on three 
fronts—the scientific community, regulatory officials, and the courts.  
Toxic torts generally have taken a lesson from that play-book. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Events in the history of public health related to cigarettes have had far-
reaching implications in the law of toxic torts.  Although Brandt’s The 
Cigarette Century is specific to the tobacco industry and its related social 
and legal circumstances, it serves to illuminate the major issues and 
problems that are unique to toxic torts and that complicate efforts to 
develop a law of toxic torts.  To reflect on the events chronicled in The 
Cigarette Century is to see clearly the source of the legal developments 
and turmoil characteristic of toxic tort law in the twenty-first century. 
Chief among these legal issues are the problems plaintiffs encounter in 
attempting to demonstrate causation.  As Brandt has shown in The 
Cigarette Century, the history of the cigarette in the United States is 
largely about the protracted process of scientific discovery and 
investigation related to chronic latent illness.  It is equally about the 
industry’s resistance to the mounting evidence of its products’ hazards and 
its public relations machine’s successful efforts to create a benign and 
appealing image for the cigarette.  The story of the cigarette in the 
twentieth century combines public law and private law in a variety of 
ways, but none more significantly than in legislation regarding the role of 
cigarette warnings in the development of modern product preemption 
doctrine.  Finally, the efforts of attorneys and state attorneys general to use 
aggregative litigation to achieve public health goals were an integral part 
of an overall mass tort initiative that set up the ongoing debate over tort 
reform and the respective roles of litigation and regulation in the public 
health arena. 
These issues resonate in current toxic tort litigation, and it is advisable 
for the toxic torts legal community to heed their lessons.  Brandt’s The 
Cigarette Century is a prism through which attorneys, judges, and scholars 
can look and learn to shape the future of toxic tort law. 
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